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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the price implication of media censorship in the context of the long-standing 
foreign share discount puzzle in China. We conjecture that the government censors negative 
news and promotes positive news in Chinese media, leading to the premium on A-shares, which 
are mainly traded by domestic investors. We find that the ratio of positive to negative news is 
substantially higher for Chinese newspapers than English newspapers. Such favouritism is 
found to inflate the price of domestic A-shares and contribute to the discount of foreign B-
shares from the same firms. We also provide evidence that B-share investors pay more attention 
to bad news, while A-share investors pay more attention to good news. Our findings suggest 
that the news perception distorted by media censorship helps to explain the foreign share 
discount puzzle and has important implications for international capital flows. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The media plays a key role in the financial market (Barber and Odean, 2008; Fang and 
Peress, 2009; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Tetlock, 2008, 2014). Media outlets such as 
newspapers generate and disseminate financial information to a broad audience in a timely 
manner (Zingales, 2000; Soltes, 2010). The media can also play an active governance role when 
direct monitoring is ineffective or costly (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). However, the ownership 
structure and freedom of the media could potentially prevent it from playing effective 
information dissemination and monitoring roles in the financial market. Using media ownership 
data of 97 countries, Djankov et al. (2003) find that greater government ownership is associated 
with lower press freedom, poorer governance and less developed stock markets. Their results 
are consistent with the public choice theory that incumbent politicians could distort and/or 
manipulate information to entrench themselves, reduce the dissemination of information and 
consequently impair markets, if the media is largely government-owned (Sen, 2001; Besley 
and Burgess, 2002). 
 
Although prior studies suggest that politicians have incentives to censor negative 
information, and press freedom could influence the development of financial markets (Djankov 
et al., 2003), how such media censorship affects stock price remains unanswered. More 
importantly, in the context of cross-border investments, what is the impact of such media 
censorship on foreign investments in stock markets (e.g. investments in cross-listed firms)? The 
answers to these pertinent questions have important implications for asset pricing, international 
capital flows and foreign investments. In this paper, we empirically examine the effect of media 
censorship on stock price in the setting of the foreign share discount in China.2 
                                                        
2 Cumming et al. (2016) test whether the difference in media coverage in the Chinese and English business press 
for the same firm is associated with the foreign share discount, using a sample of cross-listed firms between 2004 
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China provides a unique opportunity to study this issue for three important reasons. First, the 
Council on Foreign Relations notes that the Chinese government has long kept tight reins on 
the media. The France-based watchdog group Reporters Without Borders ranked China 176 out 
of 180 countries in its 2016 worldwide index of press freedom. China has the highest level of 
state ownership of newspapers (Djankov et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2014) and the lowest level of 
press freedom (Kim et al., 2014).3 Such an extreme media environment enables us to more 
easily observe the impact of media censorship on stock price. Second, the Chinese government 
has the incentive and ability to suppress unfavourable news in traditional and internet media. 
On the one hand, local governments incur a reputation cost when firms in their regions report 
poor performance, because negative information shows weakness and results in a “loss of face” 
for local politicians. On the other hand, traditional media channels (i.e. newspapers) are 
controlled by the government and party organizations through direct ownership, licensing and 
financial support (see Section 2.1 for a comprehensive discussion). The internet and social 
media are actively regulated and monitored, and both channels are subject to censorship 
(Stockmann, 2013).4 Finally, some Chinese firms have dual classes of common stock for 
domestic and foreign investors, respectively. As domestic and foreign investors are exposed to 
different media environments (e.g. different degrees of media censorship), they may trade 
                                                        
and 2008. They find that the discount is greater for firms with more coverage in the Chinese business press than 
English business press, and the effect is more salient among firms with lower analyst following and less 
institutional ownership. Our study is different from Cumming et al. (2016) in two important ways: first, we focus 
on the disparity of tone of news reported by Chinese and English newspapers (instead of the difference in number 
of news stories), and how it contributes to the magnitude of foreign share discount; second, we find that the 
divergence in tone between Chinese and English newspapers plays a more significant role in explaining the foreign 
share discount for firms with a better information environment (i.e. firms with more analyst following). This 
implies that news coverage and tone influence stock price, possibly through different channels. 
3 Kim et al. (2014) construct a press freedom proxy based on press freedom indices and some other data items 
provided by Freedom House and Reports without Borders. 
4 Since 1997, more than sixty internet regulations have been enacted by the Chinese government and implemented 
by provincial branches of state-owned internet service providers and commercial organizations. At least 18,000 
websites are blocked from mainland China, including 12 of the Top 100 Global Websites, including Google (The 
Economist, April 2013). This greatly impairs the ability of local Chinese investors in China to access information 
from the websites of foreign newspapers. 
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differently the two classes of shares, which carry identical cash flow rights. The different media 
exposure makes it possible for us to meaningfully compare stock pricing when there is a high 
degree of media censorship with stock pricing when there is little or no media censorship. 
Presumably, media censorship could be one possible explanation for the price gap between the 
dual classes of shares (i.e. the foreign share discount). Furthermore, the identical nature of both 
classes of shares allows us to conduct a relatively clean test of the net effect of media censorship 
on stock price. The foreign share discount puzzle in China is explained in detail in the following 
section.  
 
In the early 1990s, China established two separate classes of stocks, one for Chinese 
domestic investors (A-shares) and another for foreign investors (B-shares).5 Firms can issue 
both types of shares on domestic stock exchanges, but foreign (domestic) investors could only 
trade B-shares (A-shares) until 2001. B-shares have always been traded at a discount relative 
to A-shares, even since 2011, when Chinese domestic investors with foreign currency deposit 
accounts began to be allowed to invest in B-shares.6 As Figure 1 shows, the average A-B share 
discount remains around 50%.7 The puzzle still exists after the factors which were found to 
drive the discount in the literature have been substantially improved. These factors include the 
quality of corporate governance, illiquidity, difference in risk aversion and differential demand 
elasticity (Bailey, 1994; Brennan and Cao, 1997; Fernald and Rogers, 2002; Chan et al., 2008; 
Mei et al., 2009; Tong and Yu, 2012). In addition, some prior studies (e.g. Chakravarty et al., 
1998) argue that foreign investors have an information disadvantage due to language barriers 
                                                        
5 Chinese firms can also issue H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, but before November 2014 domestic 
investors were not allowed to directly invest in the Hong Kong market. Since November 17, 2014, Mainland and 
Hong Kong investors can directly invest in the Shanghai and Hong Kong markets through the “Pilot Program of 
an Interconnection Mechanism for Transactions in the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Markets”. In this study we 
focus on the price difference between A-shares and B-shares. 
6 As the holding of foreign currency is subject to strict exchange control in China, B-shares are still largely held 
by foreign investors (Tan, 2011; Hou and Lee, 2014). 
7 The drops in 2001 and 2006 were attributed to the reduced information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008) and Split 
Share Structure Reform (Hou and Lee, 2014). 
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and the difference between domestic and international accounting practices. Consequently, 
foreign investors require a higher rate of return to compensate for the high information risk, 
leading to B-shares being priced at a discount. Although the foreign share discount is a widely 
studied puzzle in the literature, the evidence on why the puzzle originates and persists is far 
from conclusive. This study intends to provide a new explanation of the puzzle based on the 
media censorship in China.  
 
The role of the media as an information channel in the financial market has been studied 
extensively. However, the impact of an important institutional feature, media censorship, on 
stock price has received limited attention. Although the Chinese government has gradually 
relaxed its tight control over domestic and international information flow in order to facilitate 
its economic reform since 1978, in the absence of laws that protect the freedom of the press in 
China, the government still has an overwhelming influence on the media. For example, 
commercial newspapers remain state-owned, and newspapers must have sponsorship from a 
government unit in order to obtain a license. Furthermore, the government continues to control 
major newspapers by maintaining ultimate power to appoint or dismiss senior editorial staff. 
These mechanisms ensure that the reporting policies and editorial practice of newspapers are 
aligned with the objectives of the government. Therefore, Chinese newspapers, which are 
considered to be under tight government control, serve the government’s political agenda.  
 
A major consequence of the state ownership and control in the Chinese media is that 
negative news tends to be censored, because the government has a strong incentive to suppress 
the release of bad news to maintain social and economic stability (Piotroski, Wong and Zhang, 
2015). For example, some news websites are regulated such that negative news (including 
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business news) accounts for no more than 30% of all news. 8  Some previous studies 
(Chakravarty et al., 1998; Cumming et al., 2016) suggest that the tight control over the Chinese 
media has a significant influence over security pricing in China. The media control not only 
applies to sensitive political news but also to business news, to some extent. There are 
particularly strong incentives for the Chinese government to exert control over news related to 
firms with B-shares, since all of these firms were carefully selected by the government and they 
are the most important players in their respective industries. In fact, most of them were so-
called “state-owned key enterprises” before going public (Chen et al., 2001). The performance 
of these firms could have a significant impact on economic growth and social stability (e.g. 
employment). As a result, the tightly controlled Chinese media tends to paint a rosy picture of 
these firms compared with its English counterpart. In contrast, the English media is not likely 
to suppress negative news about Chinese firms. The relatively more negative tone in the English 
media may lead B-share investors to trade down the B-share price of cross-listed firms, thus 
resulting in a larger foreign share discount. In addition, the great divergence between the tone 
of news reports in Chinese and English media implies more information uncertainty for cross-
listed firms; therefore, B-share investors will demand a return premium for their investment. 
Thus, we predict that a greater divergence in the tone of news reports, as reflected by a high 
ratio of good to bad news reported in Chinese and English media, is associated with a larger A-
B share discount for cross-listed firms, ceteris paribus. 
 
To perform our analysis, we collect news from mainstream Chinese and English 
newspapers and conduct an experiment in which participants are asked to read news related to 
public firms and categorise it as “good”, “bad” or “neutral”, based on their perception. Then 
we analyse whether the divergence of favouritism of news between Chinese and English media 
                                                        
8 See http://www.cnhubei.com/xwzt/2011/wmwz/gzjy/201207/t2133513.shtml (in Chinese) 
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could explain the A-B share discount. The empirical analysis confirms our prediction. First, we 
find that the Chinese media, in general, is more positive about firms with dual classes of shares 
than the English media, and we report evidence that a foreign share discount could result from 
such a higher level of favouritism in Chinese news relative to English news. In particular, our 
results show that the foreign share discount is significantly greater among firms with a larger 
number of Chinese good news reports, all else being equal. This is consistent with A-share 
prices being higher when more favourable news is reported by Chinese newspapers, leading to 
a larger difference between A-share and B-share prices. Second, we find that the foreign share 
discount is greatest when both the number of Chinese good news reports and the number of 
English bad news reports are higher. As more Chinese good news could result in an increase in 
A-share price, and more English bad news could result in a decrease in B-share price, all else 
being equal, the foreign share discount could be greatest when both effects work concurrently. 
Third, we report a significantly positive correlation both between the number of English bad 
news reports and B-share investors’ attention, and between the number of Chinese good news 
reports and A-share investors’ attention, using the Google search volume index (SVI) of a listed 
firm as the proxy for investors’ attention. This finding confirms that investors do pay attention 
to news, which is the important condition on which our argument hinges. Finally, we find that 
the positive association between the level of foreign share discount and the divergence in the 
ratio of good to bad news between Chinese news and English news is more pronounced in firms 
with a high level of analyst following. Given that firms disclosing more information usually 
have a higher level of analyst following (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996), we could expect that 
the media has a stronger influence on these firms’ share prices, as news about these firms could 
attract more attention from investors due to the improved information environment. These 
findings are robust to controlling for other determinants of foreign share discount and region, 
industry, and firm and year fixed effects.   
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Our study contributes to two important streams of the literature. We add to the growing 
literature on media ownership and control (e.g. Djankov et al., 2003; Houston et al., 2011; 
Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014) and extend the focus from corporate governance to price 
implication. We provide evidence that media censorship significantly affects stock price, and a 
lack of press freedom has important implications for the capital market and foreign stock 
investments. Media censorship also has an unfavourable impact on capital allocation decisions 
among foreign (B-share) investors. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document 
the undesired economic consequence of a lack of press freedom in the context of foreign 
investments. Second, we shed light on the long-lasting foreign share discount puzzle in China 
(Chan et al., 2008; Fernald and Rogers, 2002) by providing empirical evidence of how news 
perception is manipulated by media censorship, thus offering a new explanation of the puzzle.  
 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background and reviews the literature. Section 3 explains our approach to quantifying the tone 
of the news in this paper. Section 4 describes the sample selection process and presents the 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the results of our main specifications for the impact 
of media favouritism on the A-B share discount. Section 6 presents additional analyses and 
robustness tests. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background and the literature 
 
2.1 Newspapers in China 
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The Chinese media has long been seen as the “mouthpiece” of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and a propaganda tool under the Central Propaganda Ministry. During the period 
of 1949-1976, all news media in China was either directly funded by the government or 
indirectly funded by the government through forced subscriptions. The state’s ultimate 
ownership of news media enabled the CCP to control the media effectively (Yue and Gong, 
1997). As many studies on news media show, when newspapers are controlled by an 
authoritarian government, the government’s incentive to achieve political goals and the lack of 
competition from independent news sources could result in biased news reporting (Tullock, 
1987). In China, the tight control of the news media enables the government to employ it as a 
tool to generate positive propaganda while suppressing negative news.   
 
From the late 1970s to the late 1990s, the Chinese media went through a period of 
liberalisation, as China’s economic reform transformed economic and social structures. 
However, most non-Party publications arising from such liberalisation were absorbed into 
Party-sponsored publications during the 2003 media reform orchestrated by the Chinese 
government to consolidate existing newspapers into commercialised news groups based on 
locality (Qinglian, 2004). In general, the Chinese government has managed to continue to 
effectively control the news media and introduce an upward bias (i.e. more positive news) in 
news reporting with the intention of furthering its political agenda through various mechanisms. 
First, all newspapers must be registered under state or party organisations and are subordinated 
to a local sponsoring government unit. This mechanism worked even more effectively after the 
2003 reforms, as the consolidation process created several large media conglomerates, making 
central control of the media even easier (Hassid, 2008). In this sense, the conglomeration 
largely facilitates the central government’s monitoring of the tone of the news media. Second, 
senior editorial staff members and top managers of most major newspapers are appointed 
10 
 
directly by the Central Publicity Department (CPD) or the local propaganda departments of the 
government (Esarey, 2005). To secure their posts or seek promotion, top managers have strong 
incentives to encourage the production of positive news and filter out negative news. Third, 
journalists’ compensation packages are designed in such a way that bonuses are directly linked 
to the number of articles they publish. Therefore, “there is a strong monetary incentive to toe 
the party line in order to ensure publication” (Hassid, 2008). In other words, journalists are 
induced to be risk-averse and are likely to produce more positive news than negative news in 
order to maximise their monetary compensation.  
 
In brief, all these institutional, structural and monetary mechanisms allow the Chinese 
government to continue to exert tight control over the news media, even after a series of media 
reforms. It has been well documented that government-controlled media could distort 
information and provide upward biased views to entrench incumbent politicians, while 
independent media could supply relatively accurate news and unbiased views to the public (e.g., 
Djankov et al., 2003; Besley and Prat, 2006). Therefore, the tightly controlled Chinese news 
media is expected to generate more positive news than its independent foreign counterparts. In 
other words, the tone of Chinese news media is expected to be relatively more positive than 
English news media. Such upward bias embedded in Chinese news could also affect investors’ 
processing of relevant information, and consequently have an influence on investors’ valuation 
of stocks.9 Therefore, it is pertinent to explore the effect of the divergence of tone between 
Chinese and English media on the prices of A- and B-shares. 
                                                        
9 Hong et al. (2005) develop a model where agents use over-simplified/partial information to value stock while 
ignoring the true, more complex fundamental information, resulting in either overvaluation or undervaluation. For 
example, investors of A-shares might make persistent forecast errors while neglecting pertinent information 
signals (i.e. negative news due to media censorship), leading to a lower expected rate of return for their investment 
and therefore an overvaluation (which is reflected by the higher A-share price). Furthermore, Barber et al. (2009) 
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2.2 Setting of the Foreign Share Discount in China 
 
 
Since the early 1990s, China’s two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen have 
experienced remarkable growth, but the Chinese stock market is still dominated by 
unsophisticated retail investors. Firms that issue A-shares could also issue B-shares in the 
domestic market, and B-shares are traded in Hong Kong dollars (US dollars) in Shenzhen 
(Shanghai). Since February 2001, mainland Chinese investors have been allowed to invest in 
B-class shares; foreign investors, however, are still subject to restrictions in investing in A-
shares. Compared with A-shares, B-shares are always traded at a discount (Bailey, 1994; 
Fernald and Rogers, 2002). A number of studies provide theoretical and empirical explanation 
of the A-B share discount. For example, Bailey (1994) attributes the discount to the low 
expected return for domestic investors, because they have limited investment alternatives. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) propose that illiquid stocks usually have a higher expected 
return to compensate investors for the illiquidity risk. Because A-shares have been much more 
liquid than B-shares, B-shares are priced at a discount to compensate for the illiquidity risk. 
Another explanation of the puzzle is that there is information asymmetry between domestic and 
foreign investors. Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2008) use proprietary trading data to test the 
information asymmetry hypothesis for the A-B share discount puzzle. They use the market 
microstructure model to construct information asymmetry measures, and find such measures 
can explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in the A-B share discount. A recent 
study by Tong and Yu (2012) offers a corporate governance explanation for the A-B share 
                                                        
indicate that individual investors’ trading has a significant systematic component, suggesting that the biases of 
individual investors do not cancel out in aggregate. This may help to justify the persistence of the A-B share price 
difference. 
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discount. The authors find that the A-B share discount is larger for firms with weaker 
governance, characterised by higher ownership concentration by controlling shareholders, less 
effective boards and lower dividend payout. They conclude that, compared with domestic 
investors, B-share investors care more about the quality of corporate governance and therefore 
demand a return premium for firms with inefficient governance. 
 
On 19th February 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the 
State Foreign Exchange Administration Bureau (SAFE) announced that starting from 28th 
February 2001, domestic investors who have foreign currency deposit accounts in domestic 
banks could also invest in B-shares. Before the opening up of the B-share market to local 
investors, the average A-B share discount was 72% (Tong and Yu, 2012). Although the 
discount decreased after 2001, it continues to exist and has actually widened in recent years. 
Mei et al. (2009) run empirical tests based on the theoretical model developed by Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003), and they show that the price premium of A-shares persists after 2001 because 
there are too many speculative traders who are concerned with short-term trading profit in the 
A-share market. Therefore, they argue that such a premium could be partially induced by the 
speculative trading behaviour. Their findings echo the conclusion in a formal report issued by 
the OECD, which states that “share prices (in China) are not well-connected with corporate 
results. The market has been marred by speculation and market manipulation” (OECD, 2001). 
To summarise, evidence on the origin and persistence of the A-B share discount remains 
inconclusive.  
 
2.3 Media coverage and stock prices 
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There is a growing body of literature supporting the idea that the media plays a crucial 
role in asset pricing, as the media helps distribute information to a large audience. For example, 
Fang and Peress (2009) report that stocks with no newspaper coverage earn significantly higher 
future returns than those that are heavily covered, after controlling for size, market-to-book 
ratio, momentum and liquidity. They conclude that media coverage facilitates information 
diffusion, provides credible information to a broad audience and therefore enables the firm to 
be better recognised by investors, indicating that investors require lower returns. Engelberg and 
Parson (2011) analyse the earnings announcements of S&P 500 index firms, and they find that 
local media coverage has a strong impact on local trading in various US cities. Using a national 
newspaper strike as an exogenous event to investigate the causal link between media coverage 
and stock market behaviour, Peress (2014) reports that the trading volumes, the dispersion of 
stock returns and intraday volatility decrease significantly on strike days. The findings suggest 
that the media improves the efficiency of stock markets through facilitating the dissemination 
of information among investors. 
 
Another strand of literature focuses on the tone of media coverage. For example, Dougal 
et al. (2012) show that the identity (i.e. “bullishness” or “bearishness”) of the columnists of 
Wall Street Journal reliably predicts next-day returns on the Dow Jones Industry Average. 
Their results suggest that the trading behaviours of investors could be heavily influenced by the 
bullish or bearish sentiment conveyed by columnists. Researchers also explore the role of media 
optimism/pessimism in financial markets. For example, Tetlock (2007) reports that pessimism 
in media has strong predictive power for downward pressure on stock prices, and Tetlock et al. 
(2008) further show that the amount of negative words in news stories also forecasts earnings 
performance. Carey et al. (2016) also show that the tone of news significantly affects first-day 
pricing of IPOs in Australia. Regarding the economic consequence of press freedom, using an 
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international setting, Kim et al. (2014) find that a lack of press freedom is associated with the 
reduced ability of stock price to incorporate firm-specific information and predict future 
earnings. 
 
3. News perception 
 
This section describes the perception-based method used in classifying news in our 
study. A brief review of the existing methods used in the finance literature is given before 
introducing the rationale and the details of our method.  
 
3.1 Existing methods and drawbacks 
  
There are several widely used methods of distinguishing good news from bad in the 
finance literature. One of the most popular methods is to compare the observed disclosure with 
investors’ expectations and classify news as good (bad) when the observed value is higher 
(lower) than the expected value. This method is utilised in studies on earnings announcements 
(Patell and Wolfson, 1982; Conrad et al., 2002; Basu, 1997; Yermack, 1997; Skinner, 1994). 
However, the expectation-based method can only be used to analyse selected types of news, 
including earnings or dividend announcements. Another method is to use concurrent positive 
or negative stock returns around news announcements to categorise good or bad news (Engle 
and Ng, 1993; Jindrichovska and Mcleay, 2005). The stock-return-based method has an 
underlying assumption that abnormal returns are due solely to the news under study (Patell and 
Wolfson, 1982). Classifying news as good or bad using this method could be problematic when 
other news is released during the announcement event window of the news under study.  
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A number of previous studies employ computer-aided content analysis packages (e.g. 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Kothari et al., 2009; Roger et al., 2011) or more advanced computational-linguistic methods 
(e.g. Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Li, 2010; De Franco et al., 2014) to code reports or news. For 
example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) use a computer 
programme to extract news. Then they identify the tone of news or classify good and bad news 
by counting the number of positive and negative words, respectively. Tetlock (2007) and 
Tetlock et al. (2008) use an automated program, General Inquirer (GI), to identify the media 
tone by counting the number of words in each day’s Wall Street Journal column that fall within 
different categories based on GI’s IV-4 psychosocial dictionary. Building on research of the 
tools of computational linguistics content analysis, Antweiler and Frank (2004), Li (2010) and 
De Franco et al. (2014) employ a more advanced computational method, the Naïve Bayes 
computational process, to construct the proxy for the tone of the reports or news. This method 
can generate categorical predictions by aggregating the tone probabilities, which can increase 
the sample size compared with traditional coding methods. 
 
However, there are also potential limitations associated with the computational-
linguistic based measures of tone. These content analysis methods are prone to subjectivity in 
the analysis of narrative information, reports or news, as judgements and interpretations are 
usually inevitable during the process of defining positive and negative words (Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2003). Some computational processes (e.g. Naïve Bayes algorithm) introduce 
measurement errors, as acknowledged by De Franco et al. (2014). Furthermore, these content 
analysis based methods focus solely on information content and fail to consider the reception 
of the information, while a large body of literature shows that audience (i.e. the recipients of 
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information) plays a very important role in processing information, and “individual frames” 
(Scheufele, 1999) may be used to interpret news. 
 
3.2 Perception-based method 
 
In order to avoid the problems associated with existing methods in the finance literature, 
in this study we employ a perception-based method that has been widely applied in media and 
communication research (Sundar, 1998; Sundar, 1999; Tewksbury and Althaus, 2000; 
d’Haenens et al., 2004). In this method, good or bad news is classified based on information 
recipients’ perceptions. This sub-section describes the participants and the procedure of news 
collection and classification.  
 
Participants 
 
Seven Chinese students enrolled in the MSc programme in finance at Durham 
University (UK) participated in the experiment for their Master’s dissertations. By the time 
they joined the experiment, they had finished all coursework for their MSc study and therefore 
had English language abilities and finance knowledge comparable to stock market investors. 
We did not offer payment because they used the collected data in their Master’s dissertations.   
 
Procedure 
 
To examine Chinese and English language press coverage, we use four leading 
newspapers in Chinese and four in English. Chinese language business publications include 
China Securities Journal, Yangzi Evening Post, Securities Times and First Financial Daily. 
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English language publications include Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, China Daily and 
South China Morning Post. The Chinese news articles are collected via China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), while the English news articles are collected via Factiva. 
These newspapers were randomly allocated to the students. Students searched the Chinese 
(English) firm names for A (B) stocks’ news and read the news stories online. Then they were 
asked to classify the news as good, bad or neutral, based on their perception. After identifying 
good and bad news, we count the number of good and bad news pieces reported in Chinese and 
English media. Next, we compute the ratio of good news to bad news for a given firm in Chinese 
and English media respectively, and then calculate the ratio of good vs bad news in Chinese 
media against good vs bad news in English media. The larger the ratio, the greater the 
divergence in the tone of news coverage between Chinese and English media. 
 
Using this method, our classification of good or bad news reflects the readers’ 
perception of the information. Compared with the expectation-based method, which only works 
for certain types of corporate disclosure (e.g. earnings announcements and dividend payment), 
the major advantage of this reader-perception-based method is that it allows us to study any 
type of news. In addition, our measure contains less noise than the stock-return-based measure 
in the sense that the label (i.e. “good” or “bad”) perfectly matches each specific piece of news, 
whereas the label attached under the stock-return-based method could be misleading when there 
are multiple pieces of information released during a short event window, and it is difficult to 
conclude whether the change in stock price is due solely to the news under study. Our method 
could also circumvent the difficulty and subjectivity in defining positive and negative words in 
the content-analysis-based method. We are aware of the potential differences in readers’ 
perception of online and print news, as the delivery method (i.e. print or online) of news might 
affect readers’ estimates of a news story’s accuracy and believability (Sundar, 1999; Tewksbury 
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and Althaus, 2000). However, in our paper, the online news articles extracted from the 
platforms (CNKI and Factiva) are exactly the same as those in print newspapers in terms of 
both content and structure. Therefore, we expect that the online news in our sample has a very 
similar level of accuracy to that in print newspapers. In addition, all our online news articles 
clearly quote the sources (i.e. the names of the newspapers), which could effectively ameliorate 
the concern over the difference in credibility between online and print news. 
 
 
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
 Our sample period covers 2004-2008. Some prior studies (e.g. Hou and Lee, 2014) 
suggest that the Split Share Structure Reform during the period 2005-2007 has a significant 
impact on the A-B share discount. To ensure consistency between the pre- and post-Split Share 
Structure Reform periods, we choose one year before the reform as our starting year and one 
year after the reform as the ending year of our sample period. We first identify all listed firms 
that have both A-shares and B-shares in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Then we 
search for each of these cross-listed firms by name, and count the number of news articles about 
each firm. The search yields a total of 279,962 news reports about 88 firms during our sample 
period. Among these news reports, 100,185 reports are classified as good news, 4,738 reports 
are classified as bad news, and 175,039 reports are classified as neutral news. 
 
We use the China Center of Economic Research (CCER) and Chinese Security Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) databases to collect the data items for the computation of 
our variables. These items include market capitalization, stock turnover, state-control status, 
percentage of restricted shares, year of reform for each specific firm, stock return, return on 
assets, sales, debts, equity, debt-to-equity ratio, concentration of ownership, CEO shareholding, 
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CEO-chairman status, number of independent directors, number of board members, number of 
board meetings, industrial classifications and regions. In addition, we obtain Chinese domestic 
market returns from Datastream and US stock market returns from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). We also winsorize the top and bottom 1% of all non-dummy variables 
in order to deal with outliers. We require all of the variables to have valid values. Our final 
sample consists of 4,218 firm-month observations of 86 firms. There are 239,393 news reports 
(238,353 Chinese news and 1,040 English news) about these firms. 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. The monthly A-
B share discount (ForeignDiscount) is 43.66% on average over our sample period. The ratio of 
Chinese language good to bad news over the ratio of English language good news reports 
(RGB_NEWS) is 20.39%, indicating that the news coverage available to A-share investors is, 
on average, 20.39 (i.e. 20.39% multiplied by the scale factor 100) times more positive than that 
to B-share investors for the same firm. 10 The average number of Chinese language good news 
reports (CGNEWS) is 0.2005, while that of Chinese language bad news reports (CBNEWS) is 
only 0.0096. The big gap also shows the significant asymmetry in good and bad news reports 
in Chinese media and indicates that there is a very high level of positivity in Chinese news 
media. As Chinese media is virtually owned by the state, the descriptive statistics may suggest 
that the Chinese government censors negative news in order to maintain social and economic 
stability. The average number of English language good news reports (EGNEWS) and English 
                                                        
10 It should be noted that B-share investors also include some Chinese investors who have bought B-shares since 
the B-share market opened up to domestic investors. However, these Chinese investors are very different from 
those A-share investors in terms of information channels. As the B-share market is only open to domestic investors 
who hold foreign currency accounts, Chinese B-share investors must have either business or personal connections 
with foreign countries. Due to holding foreign currencies and their foreign connections, they usually have both a 
strong incentive to search for English news and the channels through which they can access English media. 
Therefore, these Chinese B-share investors could be very similar to foreign B-share investors in terms of their 
information acquisition. Furthermore, the B-share market is still largely dominated by foreign investors, as 
domestic investors are restricted by the limits of their access to foreign currencies due to the tight currency control 
in China (Tan, 2011). 
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language bad news reports (EBNEWS) is 0.14 (i.e. 0.0014 multiplied by the scale factor 100) 
and 0.03 (i.e. 0.0003 multiplying the scale factor 100), respectively. Although there are also 
more positive news reports than negative news reports in English news media, the gap between 
them is much narrower compared with Chinese news media. In addition, it should be noted that 
the mean and the median of StateControl are 0.793 and 1, respectively, indicating that the 
majority of the dual-listed firms in our sample are state-owned firms. This sample characteristic 
would allow us to better capture the media influence, in that state ownership may bring about 
more media favouritism.   
 
Panel B presents the total number of news reports and the ratio of good to bad news in 
Chinese and English news media, respectively. The average of the total number of Chinese 
language news reports (i.e. Chinese good and bad news reports) is 56.5085, while that of 
English language news reports is only 0.2466. The big difference shows that these dual-listed 
firms receive more Chinese media coverage than English media coverage, on average. In 
addition, Panel B also shows that the ratio of Chinese good to bad news (21.0126) is much 
higher than English good to bad news (1.1226), which suggests that, on average, Chinese news 
reports about dual-listed firms are more positive than English news reports.  
 
Panel C presents the proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports in Chinese news, 
in English news and in all news (i.e. Chinese news and English news combined), respectively. 
We observe that the average proportion of neutral news reports in Chinese news is 59.48%, 
much higher than that in English news (22.4%). The average proportion of bad news reports in 
Chinese news (4.35%) is much lower than that in English news (36.16%). Although the average 
proportion of good news reports in Chinese news (4.35%) is also lower than that in English 
news (60.45%), the ratio of the average proportion of good news reports to bad news reports in 
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Chinese news (0.3616/0.0435≈8.31) is much higher than that in English news 
(0.6045/0.1714≈3.53). This suggests that Chinese news is relatively more positive than English 
news on average. We also show how these proportions change over our sample period, on 
average, in Figure 2. Specifically, Figure 2 (a) shows the average proportion of good, bad and 
neutral news reports in Chinese news by month. Figure 2 (b) shows the average proportion of 
good, bad and neutral news reports in English news by month. Figure 2 (c) shows the average 
proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports in all news (i.e. Chinese news and English 
news combined) by month. The solid line, the dotted line and the fine line represent good news, 
bad news and neutral news, respectively. 
 
5. Media control and foreign share discount 
 
5.1 Favouritism in news and foreign share discount 
 
The English media is considered to be more independent, as they are not subject to the 
intervention of the Chinese government, while the Chinese media tends to lack independence 
and issues more positive news. Thus, we predict that the positive biased tone of news coverage 
of Chinese and English media as reflected by the ratio of good to bad news reported in Chinese 
and English media could lead to a larger foreign share discount. To test the prediction, we use 
the following regression model: 
 
ForeignDiscounti,t = α0 + α1 RGB_NEWSi,t 
+ α2 RelativeMVi,t-1+ α3 RelativeTOi,t-1 + α4 StateControli,t-1+ α5 Reformi,t + 
α6RelativeRETi,t-1 
+ α7 Betai,t-1 + α8 FSIi,t-1 + α9 ROAi,,t-1 + α10 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + α11 TobinQi,t-1 + α12 
Leveragei,t-1 
+ α13 OwnershipCi,t-1 + α14 CHOLDi,t-1 + α15 CDUALi,t-1 + α16 BINDPi,t-1 + α17 BSIZEi,t-1  
+ α18 BMEETi,t-1 + Region + Industry + Firm + Year + εit                                                                (1) 
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We also explore whether a certain type of news (i.e. Chinese/English good/bad news) affects 
the foreign share discount in the following regression model: 
 
ForeignDiscounti,t = β0 + β1 CGNEWSi,t + β2 EBNEWSi,t 
+ β3 RelativeMVi,t-1 + β4 RelativeTOi,t-1 + β5 StateControli,t-1 + β6 Reformi,t + β7 
RelativeRETi,t-1 
+ β8 Betai,t-1 + β9 FSIi,t-1 + β10 ROAi,t-1 + β11 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + β12 TobinQi,t-1 + β13 
Leveragei,t-1 
+ β14 OwnershipCi,t-1 + β15 CHOLDi,t-1 + β16 CDUALi,t-1 + β17 BINDPi,t-1 + β18 BSIZEi,t-1  
+ β19 BMEETi,t-1 + Region + Industry + Firm + Year +εit                                                                 (2) 
 
In our regression models, the dependent variable, ForeignDiscounti,t, represents the 
discount in B-shares of firm i at the end of month t. It is defined as the price of A-shares minus 
the price of B-shares divided by the price of A-shares. According to this definition, the higher 
the value of ForeignDiscounti,t, the greater the foreign share discount. We use the key 
independent variables RGB_NEWSi,t in Equation (1) and CGNEWSi,t and EBNEWSi,t in 
Equation (2). RGB_NEWSi,t is the ratio of Chinese language good to bad news over the ratio 
of English language good to bad news, divided by 100. The ratio of Chinese (English) language 
good to bad news is the number of Chinese (English) good news reports over the number of 
Chinese (English) bad news reports. Based on this definition, a higher value of RGB_NEWSi,t 
indicates relatively more positive news exposure of A-share investors relative to that of B-share 
investors of the same firm. CGNEWSi,t and EBNEWSi,t in Equation (2) are defined as the 
number of Chinese good news reports divided by 100 and the number of English bad news 
reports divided by 100, respectively.11 
 
                                                        
11 The number of Chinese bad news reports (i.e. CBNEWS) and the number of English good news reports (i.e. 
EGNEWS) are not included in the regression, because the high correlation between CGNEWS and CBNEWS 
and the high correlation between EBNEWS and EGNEWS could result in the problem of the multicollinearity. 
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Our regression models also include four groups of control variables. The first group of 
variables is used to consider information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008), market liquidity (Chen 
et al., 2001), ownership structure (Hou and Lee, 2012) and investor speculation (Mei et al., 
2009), as they are discussed in prior research as potential explanations for the Chinese foreign 
share discount. RelativeMVi,t−1 is defined as the market capitalization of A-shares divided by 
that of B-shares at the end of the previous month. As the size of firms is generally believed to 
be negatively related to information asymmetry, firms with large relative size of A-shares to B-
shares, measured by market capitalization, could have higher levels of information asymmetry 
between A-share investors and B-share investors. RelativeTOi,t−1 is defined as the turnover of 
A-shares divided by that of B-shares at the end the previous month. This ratio is used to control 
for the relative liquidity of A-shares to B-shares. StateControli,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a firm is state-controlled, and 0 otherwise. Reformi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 
year of and the years after Split Share Structure Reform, and 0 for the years before this reform. 
Prior studies suggest that majority shareholders and outside minority shareholders are likely to 
have a higher level of conflict of interest in state-controlled firms and before the reform. 
RelativeRETi,t−1 is defined as the stock returns of A-shares divided by that of B-shares in the 
previous month. Prior studies show that high past returns could increase speculation activities. 
Including this variable in our regressions could help us control for the relative movement 
between the price of A-shares and that of B-shares. 
 
Our second group of control variables consists of the factors related to equity cost of 
capital. Betai,t−1  is used to control for the systematic risk of a firm and is defined as the beta in 
CAPM in the previous year. We estimate it by regressing the daily excess return of each firm 
on daily excess returns of the market for the past year. FSIi,t−1 is used as a proxy for the change 
in the firm-specific information environment. It is defined as the change in the residual variance 
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of the informativeness of share price in the previous year. Following the method employed in 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), we first obtain the R-square (i.e. goodness of fit) by regressing 
the weekly excess returns of each firm on both Chinese and US weekly market excess returns. 
We then calculate the natural log of the ratio of (1-R-square) to R-square as the value of this 
variable. ROAi,t−1 represents the return on assets based on industry median adjustment in the 
last fiscal year. This is used as the measure of a firm’s profitability and defined as the ratio of 
operating income to total assets. ∆SalesGrowthi,t−1 is defined as the change of sales growth in 
percentage in the last fiscal year. It is used to control for the growth on the demand side. 
TobinQi,t−1 represents the Tobin’s Q of the firm and serves as a proxy for firm performance. It 
is calculated as the ratio of the sum of debt and market value to total equity in the last fiscal 
year. Leveragei,t−1 is the ratio of debt to equity of the last fiscal year. It is used to control for 
financial distress. 
 
Our third group of control variables consists of the factors related to the quality of corporate 
governance. Prior studies (Lombardo and Pagano, 2002; Tong and Yu, 2011) show that 
governance has a significant impact on equity cost capital and could help explain the Chinese 
foreign share discount. OwnershipCi,t−1 represents the concentration of ownership in the last 
fiscal year. We measure the concentration by using the Herfindahl index, which considers the 
holdings of the firm’s ten largest shareholders. CHOLDi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the shareholding of a CEO in a firm fell in the top 25 percent or the bottom 25 percent of cross-
sectional shareholdings of CEOs in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.12 This variable is used 
to control for the effects of potential agency problems, as prior studies show that high CEO 
ownership may lead to managerial entrenchment, while low CEO ownership may result in the 
                                                        
12 As a robustness check, we also use the raw value of the proportion of shares held by the CEO instead of the 
dummy variable (CHOLD) to run regressions in Equations (1) and (2). The results are essentially unchanged, as 
shown in Appendix D.1 and Appendix D.2. 
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insufficient alignment of CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests. CDUALi,t−1 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO of a firm was also the board chair in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
Boards tend to have relatively less monitoring power when the CEO of the firm also sits on the 
board as the chair. BINDPi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the proportion of independent 
directors on the board was higher than the cross-sectional median proportion in the last fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. Prior studies show that independent directors usually play a more 
effective role in monitoring managers. BSIZEi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board 
size of a firm in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median board size, and 
0 otherwise. BMEETi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board meetings of a 
firm in the last fiscal year was greater than the cross-sectional median number of board 
meetings, and 0 otherwise. The higher frequency of board meetings might indicate more active 
monitoring of a board. We also consider firm, year and month fixed effects in our regressions. 
 
 Table 2 presents the regression analyses of the test. Regression 1 shows that after 
controlling for firm and year fixed effects, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is significantly 
positive (coef. = 0.0076, t = 2.01). After controlling for other determinants of foreign share 
discounts, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is still significantly positive in Regressions 2 and 3. 
We also add month fixed effects in Regression 4 and 5, and the coefficients and significance 
levels are essentially unchanged. The results suggest that the fact that Chinese news is more 
positive than English news contributes to the foreign share discount puzzle. The divergence of 
tone in the news media seems to have a significant impact on A-share and B-share prices, 
consistent with Tetlock (2007, 2008). Specifically, due to tight government control, Chinese 
media is relatively more reluctant to report negative news than English media, which could lead 
A-share investors to be more optimistic about a firm than B-share investors and thus trade up 
the A-share price. By contrast, foreign media is considered to be more objective and more likely 
26 
 
to report negative news than Chinese media, which could lead B-share investors to be more 
pessimistic about a firm than A-share investors and thus trade down the B-share price. 
Therefore, the divergence of tone in the media could increase the difference between A-share 
and B-share prices and, consequently, lead to a larger foreign share discount. Our finding 
provides an alternative/complementary explanation for the foreign share discount puzzle, 
showing that not only the levels of news coverage, as suggested by Cumming et al. (2016), but 
also the tone of news media is important in explaining the foreign share discount.13    
 
The coefficients of most control variables are largely in line with the findings in prior 
studies. In particular, across Regression 2 to Regression 5, we find significant positive 
coefficients for both RelativeMV and RelativeTO, which suggests that firms with higher levels 
of information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008) and lower levels of liquidity (Chen et al., 2001) 
are likely to have higher discounts in their B-shares. Consistent with Hou and Lee (2012), we 
also find a significant positive coefficient for StateControl 14  and a significant negative 
coefficient for Reform, which suggests that more conflicts of interest between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders could lead to a higher discount in B-shares. In addition, 
we report that the coefficients of Beta and OwnershipC are significantly positive, and the 
coefficient of ROA is significantly negative in Regression 3 and Regression 4. These results 
suggest that the higher foreign share discount of a firm could be associated with higher exposure 
of systematic risks, higher ownership concentration and lower profitability.  
 
                                                        
13 To examine whether our results are distorted by the firm-month observations in which there is no English news, 
we remove those observations and rerun the parallel regressions. Our results are robust to the exclusion of those 
observations. 
14 To further examine whether media censorship plays a larger role in state-controlled firms in explaining the 
foreign share discount, we split the full sample into two subsamples, state-controlled firms and non-state-
controlled firms. Then we run regressions using Equation (2) for both subsamples, respectively. We find that the 
coefficient of RGB_NEWS is only significant in the state-controlled subsample, and not in the non-state-controlled 
subsample, as reported in Appendix C. 
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5.2 The number of good vs bad news reports 
 
        
Our result in Table 2 shows a significant positive association between the relative 
positivity of Chinese media to English media, as measured by RGB_NEWS, and foreign share 
discount. In this section, we further explore whether this relation is mainly driven by Chinese 
good news or English bad news, by using Equation (2) to run regressions. Table 3 presents the 
regression results. We find that the coefficients of CGNEWS (i.e. Chinese good news) are 
significant and positive across Regression 1 to Regression 6. In particular, the coefficient of 
CGNEWS is significantly positive (coef. = 0.0079, t = 1.79), after controlling for firm and year 
fixed effects in Regression 1.15 This result is in line with our findings in Table 2, suggesting 
that more Chinese good news could result in a higher A-share price and, consequently, the gap 
between A-share price and B-share price would widen (i.e. there would be a larger foreign share 
discount), ceteris paribus. In Regression 2, we include in our model a comprehensive set of 
control variables to control for firm-specific characteristics and other possible explanations. 
The result shows that the coefficient of CGNEWS is even higher and more significant (coef. = 
0.0085, t = 3.16) than in Regression 1. When we further add firm and year fixed effects, the 
coefficient of CGNEWS is still significantly positive (coef. = 0.0071, t = 1.85), although the 
magnitude and the significance level decrease slightly, as shown in Regression 3. On the other 
hand, we find the signs of the coefficients of EBNEWS (i.e. English bad news) are positive 
across all specifications, although not statistically significant. The positive signs are consistent 
with our prediction that more English bad news could result in a lower B-share price and, 
consequently, the gap between A-share price and B-share price would widen (i.e. there would 
be a larger foreign share discount), ceteris paribus.  
                                                        
15  In Appendix E, we also present the results of the regressions based on the unscaled CGNEWS and EBNEWS 
(i.e. unscaled by 100). The coefficient of CGNEWS in Regression 1 is 0.0001 (sig. at 10% level), suggesting that 
the increase of one Chinese good news report is associated with a one basis point increase in the foreign share 
discount. 
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After examining the impact of Chinese good news and English bad news, respectively, 
we further investigate the potential joint effect of both types of news on foreign share discount. 
To conduct the test, we include an interaction term, CGNEWS*EBNEWS, in Equation (2) and 
run the regressions. Interestingly, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term is 
significantly positive (coef. = 2.035, t = 2.32) in Regression 4. It should be noted that when 
including all fixed effects in Regression 7, the coefficient of the interaction term is still 
significant, although the coefficient of CGNEWS loses significance. This result suggests that 
the positive association between the number of Chinese good news reports and the foreign share 
discount is strongest when the number of English bad news reports is greater. In other words, 
a greater number of Chinese good news reports may result in an increase in A-share price, and 
a greater number of English bad news reports may result in a decrease in B-share price; when 
both effects work concurrently, the foreign share discount is expected to be the greatest. Our 
result is consistent with this expectation. The result is similar when we run parallel regressions 
with firm, year and month fixed effects. 
 
Taking the results together, we find evidence that more Chinese good news and more 
English bad news are both associated with a greater foreign share discount; and the positive 
Chinese media seems to play a larger and more significant role in explaining the foreign share 
discount. Moreover, our results suggest that the joint effect of both types of news could result 
in the widest gap between A-share price and B-share price and, consequently, lead to the 
greatest foreign share discount.  
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6. Additional analysis and robustness tests 
 
6.1 Investors’ attention 
 
 
Previous sections discuss the impact on the foreign share discount of the divergence in 
tone between Chinese and English news. The underlying assumption of this association is that 
investors do pay attention to media coverage. As argued by Kahneman (1973), investor 
attention is a scarce cognitive resource, and investors have limited attention. Since the market 
is constantly exposed to all types of media coverage and news, it is important to establish the 
link between media coverage and investors’ attention. Without investors paying sufficient 
attention or considering the news in their assessment of asset allocation, it is difficult for the 
media to play a role in security pricing and to conclude that the association between a certain 
type of media coverage and security price is meaningful (Da et al., 2011). In our study, it is 
particularly important to take investors’ attention into consideration when examining the 
impact of the tone of news reports on stock returns in the Chinese stock market. As the Chinese 
media is under tight government control, it is unclear and undocumented in the literature 
whether investors pay any attention to the news in general or to a particular type of news (such 
as good versus bad news) reported in the Chinese media. The argument that the divergence in 
the tone of news coverage between Chinese and English media could result in the gap between 
A-share price and B-share price hinges on the condition that investors do pay attention to news. 
In other words, investors could only respond to news reports if they pay attention to them. 
Furthermore, although prior research documents evidence on the correlation between news and 
the movement in security prices (e.g. Skinner and Sloan, 2002), there is a missing link in the 
documented correlation – whether certain types of news attract more investor attention than 
others. The test of such correlation is important, as investors’ responses are not only related to 
their news exposure (i.e. the number and tone of news reports) but also depend on how much 
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attention they pay to different types of news (i.e. Chinese/English good/bad news). Therefore, 
in our study we specifically examine investor attention to Chinese/English good/bad news, 
respectively.  
 
Following Da et al. (2011), who first proposed the measure, we use the Search Volume 
Index (SVI) as an ex post measure of investors’ active attention. The rationale is, if an investor 
is searching for a firm, it is clear that the investor is paying attention to that firm. Some recent 
studies (e.g. Da et al., 2011; Drake et al., 2012; Andrei and Hasler, 2014; Vozlyublennaia, 2014; 
Ding and Hou, 2015) show that SVI is correlated with other measures of investor attention and 
captures investor attention in a more timely manner than other measures. Moreover, SVI 
predicts stock prices in two weeks’ time and their reversals, and is correlated with various price 
indexes. Our data source for SVI is Google Trends, which provides the frequency of search 
terms, dating back to January 2004. SVI for a search term is calculated as the number of 
searches for that term scaled by its time-series average. For our study, we identify search 
frequencies by the Chinese and English names of our sample firms, respectively, in Google 
Trends (https://www.google.com/trends/). We download the weekly SVIs for individual stocks, 
and then convert the weekly SVIs to monthly sum SVIs by aggregating the weekly SVIs in 
each month. We also calculate the average and the median of the weekly SVIs in each month. 
Finally, the sum, the average and the median SVIs are scaled by 100.  
 
Table 4 presents the correlations of A-share (B-share) investor attention with Chinese 
(English) language good and bad news under firm and year fixed effects controls. We use the 
sum, the average and the median Chinese (English) SVI as the proxy for A-share (B-share) 
investor attention. The results in Panel A show that Chinese good news coverage is significantly 
positively correlated with the sum (coef. = 0.1739, sig. at 1%), the average (coef. = 0.0401, sig. 
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at 1%) and the median (coef. = 0.0396, sig. at 1%) level of attention from A-share investors. 
On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between Chinese bad news coverage and 
the level of attention from A-share investors. These findings may suggest that A-share investors 
are heavily influenced by the positive tone of Chinese media and pay more attention to good 
news than to bad news. Consequently, the extremely high level of attention of A-share investors 
to good news could result in their over-reaction to good news. This is consistent with our 
finding in Table 3 that, all else being equal, a larger number of Chinese good news reports 
widen the gap between A-share and B-share price (i.e. increase the foreign share discount), as 
A-share investors tend to pay more attention to and over-react to good news.  
 
By contrast, the results in Panel B show that English bad news coverage is significantly 
positively correlated with the sum (coef. = 20.7203, sig. at 5%), the average (coef. = 4.2445, 
sig. at 5%) and the median (coef. = 4.1698, sig. at 5%) level of attention from B-share investors, 
but there is no significant correlation between English good news coverage and the level of 
attention from B-share investors. The results indicate that B-share investors pay more attention 
to bad news, which could lead to their over-reaction to bad news. One possible explanation for 
B-share investors’ high level of attention to bad news is that they are likely to be heavily 
influenced by the general tone of English media. As shown in Panel B of Table 1, English 
media is much less positive (i.e. relatively more negative) about Chinese cross-listing firms 
than Chinese media, on average. Therefore, bad news could attract more attention from B-share 
investors than good news, given the relatively negative tone of the English media. Furthermore, 
B-share investors could find bad news more salient than good news, due to their relatively high 
degree of loss aversion, a key feature of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
whereas A-share investors are less likely to have a high degree of loss aversion due to the home 
bias (Graham et al., 2009). Because of their loss aversion, B-share investors care more about 
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losses than gains, even if they are of the same magnitude. B-share investors may even be 
concerned about unknown problems, because the released bad news could be the “tip of the 
iceberg”. Such concern may result in a large drop in B-share price. Therefore, English bad news 
could have a stronger impact on the share price of cross-listed firms than English good news.  
 
In brief, the results presented in Panels A and B of Table 4 suggest that good news 
attracts more attention from A-share investors, whereas bad news attracts more attention from 
B-share investors. Consequently, A-share investors are likely to over-react to Chinese good 
news and B-share investors are likely to over-react to English bad news, which could increase 
the gap between A-share and B-share price (i.e. increase the foreign share discount). These 
findings provide supporting evidence of the link between media coverage and investor 
attention, and they highlight the possible channels (i.e. Chinese good news and English bad 
news) through which the tone of media is likely to have an impact on the foreign share discount.  
 
6.2. Information asymmetry 
 
As discussed in previous sections, the information asymmetry between Chinese media 
and English media could help explain the foreign share discount. However, previous studies 
(Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005; Yohn, 1998; Cumming et al., 2016) show that analyst 
following might mitigate the effect of such information asymmetry. Financial analysts regularly 
generate analyst reports on the performance of the firms they follow, which provide 
additional/alternative information about the firms to investors. Analyst reports are usually 
believed to be more informative and credible, as financial analysts are more knowledgeable 
about the firms than journalists. Therefore, investors are likely to rely more on analyst reports 
and less on news media whenever analyst reports are available. Thus, the effect of the 
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information asymmetry in news media is expected to be less pronounced among firms with 
greater financial analyst following.  
 
Therefore, we conduct an additional analysis to examine whether analyst following has 
an impact on the relationship between the divergence in the ratio of good to bad news between 
Chinese and English media and the foreign share discount for a firm. To test the impact of 
analyst following, we split the full sample into two subsamples based on the sample median of 
analyst following. Specifically, we include a firm in the low-following subsample if the natural 
log of the number of analysts following it is lower than the median of the natural log of the 
number of analysts following it. Otherwise, we include the firm in the high-following 
subsample. We then run regressions using Equation (1) for both subsamples, respectively. The 
results are presented in the first two columns of Table 5. We report that the coefficient of 
RGB_NEWS is only significantly positive (coef.= 0.00637, t = 1.823) in the high-following 
subsample (i.e. low information asymmetry) in Regression 2, and not in the low-following 
subsample (i.e. high information asymmetry) in Regression 1. This implies that investors could 
be significantly influenced by the tone of media coverage when there are many analysts 
following. This finding contradicts Cumming et al. (2016), who suggest that the effect of the 
level of media coverage (i.e. number of news reports) on the foreign share discount is more 
pronounced among firms with a lower analyst following, as investors may depend on media 
coverage more if analysts’ reports are less available. A plausible explanation for our results 
might be that firms with a greater analyst following usually provide more informative 
disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). News about these firms could attract more attention 
from investors due to the high level of informativeness in the news, and consequently the tone 
of the news could have a greater impact on investors. Indeed, the results in Panel C of Table 4 
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show that the level of analyst following16 is positively correlated with the sum (coef. = 0.6329, 
sig. at 5%), the average (coef. = 0.1460, sig. at 5%) and the median (coef. = 0.1446, sig. at 5%) 
level of investors’ attention proxied by the SVI. This finding suggests that investors pay more 
attention to news reports about firms with a greater analyst following.  
 
We also use analyst forecast dispersion as an alternative proxy for information 
asymmetry in our regressions, considering that analysts may be more likely to follow large 
firms or industry leaders, and the number of analysts following could be an inappropriate 
measure of information asymmetry. Forecast dispersion is calculated as the standard deviation 
of the Current EPS estimate for the specified fiscal time period, divided by the mean EPS 
estimate. Then we split the full sample into two subsamples based on the sample median of 
forecast dispersion. Specifically, we include a firm in the high-forecast-dispersion subsample 
if forecast dispersion is higher than the median forecast dispersion. Otherwise, we include the 
firm in the low-forecast-dispersion subsample. We run regressions using Equation (1) for both 
subsamples, respectively. The results are presented in the last two columns in Table 5. The 
coefficient of RGB_NEWS is only significantly positive (coef. = 0.00980, t = 2.052) in the 
low-forecast-dispersion subsample (i.e. low information asymmetry) in Regression 4, and not 
in the high-forecast-dispersion subsample (i.e. low information asymmetry) in Regression 3. 
Therefore, the results based on the alternative proxy (i.e. forecast dispersion) are very similar 
to those based on the number of analyst following. 
 
6.3. Robustness tests 
 
                                                        
16The level of analyst following is defined as the natural log of the number of analysts following multiplied by 
100. 
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We conduct several analyses to test the robustness of our results. First, as there might 
be an omitted variable concern for the relation between favouritism in news and foreign share 
discount, we use a change-in-change approach to address this potential problem. Specifically, 
we take the first difference by month for both the dependent variable and the independent 
variable. Then we run regressions using Equation (1). The results are presented in Table 6. The 
coefficient of RGB_NEWS is positive and highly significant across all specifications, similar 
to the results in Table 2. 
 
Second, we run robustness tests using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach. 
We use a nearest-neighbour propensity score matching based on year, month, industry,17 
region,18 and firm and board characteristics (including market value, turnover, state ownership, 
stock returns, Beta, FSI, ROA, sales growth, Tobin’s Q, ownership concentration, CEO 
shareholding, CEO duality, board independence, board size and number of board meetings). 
The results are presented in Table 7, and they are very similar to those presented in Table 2. 
 
Third, to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, we log transform both the 
dependent variable and the main independent variable in Equation (1). We also remove the 
scale factor (i.e. 100) from the main independent variable. Then we re-run the regressions. The 
results are presented in Table 8. Regression 1 shows that after controlling for firm and year 
fixed effects, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is significantly positive (coef. = 0.0106, t = 2.37). 
This suggests that a one percent change in the relative favouritism in Chinese to English news 
increases the foreign share discount by approximately one basis point. After controlling for 
                                                        
17 Industries are defined based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code. We consider the first 
two digits of the GICS code in our industry classification. 
18 We follow Firth et al. (2006) to define regions according to the level of economic development. 
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other determinants of foreign share discounts, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is still 
significantly positive across Regression 2 to Regression 5. 
 
Finally, as Cumming et al. (2016) find that the logarithm of the ratio of Chinese to 
English news reports affects the foreign share discount, we further examine whether our results 
are driven by such effect. We split the full sample into two subsamples based on the ratio of 
Chinese to English news reports. Specifically, we include a firm in the low-ratio subsample if 
the ratio of Chinese to English news reports is lower than the median of the ratio of Chinese to 
English news reports. Otherwise, we include the firm in the high-ratio subsample. We then run 
regressions using Equation (1) for both subsamples, respectively. The results are presented in 
Appendix B. We find that the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is significantly positive in both the 
low-ratio and the high-ratio subsamples, which suggests that our results are not likely to be 
driven by the ratio of the number of Chinese to English news reports.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the effect of media censorship on stock price and foreign stock 
investments, using the setting of the foreign share discount puzzle in China, a topical issue in 
the literature. Existing studies on the puzzle have provided various explanations, such as the 
differential demand hypothesis (Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995), the illiquidity risk of foreign 
shares (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Lee et al., 2001), speculative trading behaviours in the 
A-share market (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and the information disadvantage of B-share 
investors (Brennan and Cao, 1997). Besides these explanations, the role of the media in 
explaining the Chinese foreign share discount is attracting growing attention. For example, 
Cumming et al. (2016) show that the differential level of Chinese and English news coverage 
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is significantly related to the foreign share discount. However, most studies in this area only 
explore the impact of the level of media coverage (i.e. the number of news reports in Chinese 
and English media) on the foreign share discount. Our study focuses on the role of an important 
institutional feature of the media, media censorship, in explaining the foreign share discount, 
by employing a direct measure of good and bad news based on readers’ perceptions.  
 
Our findings are summarised as follows. First, we show that Chinese media is generally 
much more positive about firms with dual classes of shares than English media, suggesting that 
the Chinese government may censor negative news to maintain economic stability. More 
importantly, such media censorship could affect stock price. Specifically, we find that firms 
with a higher level of positive news reports in Chinese relative to English media are associated 
with greater foreign share discounts. This result suggests that A-share investors are 
significantly influenced by the favourable tone of Chinese media, resulting in a larger 
difference between A-share and B-share price. In particular, we find that the larger the number 
of Chinese good news reports, the greater the foreign share discount, which is consistent with 
A-share price being higher and the gap between A-share and B-share price being wider when 
more favourable news is reported in Chinese media, all else being equal. Second, the co-
existence of a large number of Chinese good news reports and a large number of English bad 
news reports could result in the widest gap between A-share price and B-share price and 
therefore lead to the highest level of foreign share discount. Third, using SVI to capture 
investors’ attention, we report evidence that English bad news attracts more attention from B-
share investors, whereas Chinese good news attracts more attention from A-share investors. 
This may also help to explain the observed B-share investors’ over-reaction to bad news. 
Finally, we show the effect of the positivity in Chinese news relative to English news on the 
foreign share discount to be more pronounced among firms with a better information 
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environment, reflected by greater analyst coverage. Lang and Lundholm (1996) conclude that 
there is usually greater analyst following if firms provide more informative disclosures. It could 
be expected that news of these firms could contain more informative content and therefore 
attract more attention from investors, consequently having a greater impact on the price 
difference between A-B shares.   
 
Our study has two important implications. First, media censorship could significantly 
affect international asset pricing. As shown in the Chinese setting, the government’s tight 
control of the release of negative information leads to a wide divergence between the tone of 
Chinese and English media, and could have undesired capital market consequences (i.e. a large 
foreign share discount). Second, besides the level and tone of media coverage, the attention of 
domestic and foreign investors could also play an important role in explaining the impact of 
media coverage on the foreign share discount. 
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Figure 1. Average Foreign Share Discount (Jan 1998 – Dec 2008) 
 
This figure shows the average monthly foreign share discounts of Chinese firms between January 
1998 and December 2008. 
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Figure 2. Average proportion of good/bad/neutral news reports 
 
This figure shows the average monthly proportion of good/bad/neutral news reports in 
Chinese/English/total over our sample period. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables. The variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
Panel A   Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Med Min Max Obs. 
 
ForeignDiscount 0.4366 0.1556 0.4513 0.0239 0.8069 4,218 
RGB_NEWS 0.2039 0.6400 0.0100 0 7.1700 4,218 
CGNEWS 0.2005 0.6097 0 0 3.4400 4,218 
CBNEWS 0.0096 0.0721 0 0 1.2000 4,218 
EGNEWS 0.0014 0.0059 0 0 0.0700 4,218 
EBNEWS 0.0003 0.0026 0 0 0.1000 4,218 
RelativeMV 1.1027 0.0894 1.0946 0.9400 1.3677 4,218 
RelativeTO 1.3718 0.2565 1.3320 0.6769 4.0320 4,218 
StateControl 0.7930 0.4052 1 0 1 4,218 
Reform 0.4912 0.5000 0 0 1 4,218 
RelativeRET 0.9928 6.1070 0.8466 -118.3679 168.6101 4,218 
Beta 1.1319 0.3394 1.1276 0.0953 2.8371 4,218 
FSI -0.5561 1.9583 0.0156 -19.9922 0.9502 4,218 
ROA 0.0002 0.0200 0.0014 -0.1021 0.0442 4,218 
∆SalesGrowth 0.2737 1.2348 0.1384 -0.8090 14.9185 4,218 
TobinQ 0.6893 0.2431 0.7205 0.0001 1.5510 4,218 
Leverage 0.5513 0.2722 0.5205 0.0874 2.0497 4,218 
OwnershipC 0.1736 0.1263 0.1295 0.0044 0.6748 4,218 
CHOLD 0.3046 0.4603 0 0 1 4,218 
CDUAL 0.0308 0.1729 0 0 1 4,218 
BINDP 0.1036 0.3048 0 0 1 4,218 
BSIZE 0.3480 0.4764 0 0 1 4,218 
BMEET 0.5372 0.4987 1 0 1 4,218 
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Panel B   Number of news reports and the ratio of good to bad news per firm-month 
 Mean Std. Dev. Med Min Max Obs. 
       
Total number of Chinese language news reports 56.5085 129.1882 0 0 600 4,218 
Total number of English language news reports 0.2466 0.9016 0 0 10 4,218 
Chinese language good to bad news  21.0126 60.9803 1 0.0083 345 4,218 
English language good to bad news  1.1226 0.5957 1 0.0909 8 4,218 
       
Panel C   Proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports 
 Mean Std. Dev. Med Min Max Obs. 
       
Chinese news 
 
Good 0.3616 0.3335 0.4665 0 1 4,218 
Bad 0.0435 0.1488 0 0 1 4,218 
Neutral 0.5948 0.3191 0.5 0 1 4,218 
       
English news 
 
Good 0.6045 0.4606 1 0 1 4,218 
Bad 0.1714 0.3577 0 0 1 4,218 
Neutral 0.2240 0.3639 0 0 1 4,218 
       
All news 
 
Good 0.3936 0.3543 0.4930 0 1 4,218 
Bad 0.0569 0.1832 0 0 1 4,218 
Neutral 0.5495 0.3404 0.4857 0 1 4,218 
       
The sample period covers 2004 to 2008 and includes A- and B-share cross-listing firms that traded in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
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Table 2. The impact of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign share discount 
 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign share discount. 
  
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression  
(5) 
RGB_NEWS 0.0076** 0.0101*** 0.0074** 0.0101*** 0.0074** 
 (2.01) (2.66) (2.249) (2.649) (2.195) 
RelativeMV  0.6137*** 0.497* 0.614** 0.496* 
   (2.56) (1.940) (2.558) (1.928) 
RelativeTO  0.0921*** 0.0734*** 0.0922*** 0.0737*** 
   (5.08) (4.384) (5.072) (4.382) 
StateControl  0.0395** 0.0350** 0.0395** 0.0350** 
   (2.42) (2.240) (2.417) (2.231) 
Reform  ‒0.0388*** -0.110*** -0.0389*** -0.111*** 
   (‒3.59) (-10.07) (-3.588) (-10.16) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.000114 0.000284 0.000131 
   (1.28) (0.523) (1.281) (0.594) 
Beta  ‒0.0081 0.0268* -0.00812 0.0267* 
    (‒0.53) (1.678) (-0.530) (1.668) 
FSI  ‒0.0065* -0.000419 -0.00647* -0.000464 
    (‒1.74) (-0.224) (-1.732) (-0.250) 
ROA  ‒0.3839 -0.471* -0.384 -0.473* 
    (‒1.43) (-1.858) (-1.429) (-1.852) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0052* 0.00396 0.00520 0.00386 
   (1.64) (1.273) (1.629) (1.232) 
TobinQ  ‒0.0402* -0.00203 -0.0402* -0.00204 
    (‒1.70) (-0.0969) (-1.697) (-0.0968) 
Leverage  0.1288* 0.0741 0.129* 0.0738 
   (1.73) (1.173) (1.733) (1.165) 
OwnershipC  0.0745 0.137** 0.0743 0.138** 
   (0.59) (2.182) (0.590) (2.183) 
CHOLD  ‒0.0185 -0.0139 -0.0185 -0.0140 
   (‒0.79) (-0.666) (-0.789) (-0.667) 
CDUAL  ‒0.0295 -0.0137 -0.0295 -0.0135 
   (‒1.01) (-0.458) (-1.010) (-0.453) 
BINDP  0.0145 0.0177 0.0144 0.0180 
   (0.77) (1.113) (0.770) (1.122) 
BSIZE  ‒0.0283 -0.0128 -0.0282 -0.0130 
   (‒1.27) (-0.600) (-1.268) (-0.607) 
BMEET  ‒0.0109 -0.00233 -0.0109 -0.00230 
   (‒0.94) (-0.207) (-0.943) (-0.203) 
constant 0.3913*** ‒0.4123 -0.170 -0.412 -0.166 
  (45.42)  (‒1.52) (-0.572) (-1.516) (-0.559) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0357 0.0333 0.1241 0.0333 0.1260 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
51 
 
Table 3. Chinese language good and bad news vs English language good and bad news 
 
This table presents the impact of the number of Chinese and English news reports on the foreign share discount. 
  
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
(6) 
Regression 
(7) 
CGNEWS 0.0079* 0.0085*** 0.0071* 0.0074*** 0.00654* 0.00852** 0.00643 
 (1.79) (3.16) (1.85) (2.71) (1.691) (2.031) (1.654) 
EBNEWS 0.389 0.742 0.533 0.223 0.168 0.342 0.184 
 (0.78) (1.24) (1.54) (0.35) (0.462) (0.606) (0.497) 
CGNEWS*EBNEWS    2.035** 1.460* 2.009* 1.478* 
    (2.32) (1.760) (1.886) (1.803) 
RelativeMV  0.419*** 0.478* 0.419*** 0.499* 0.615** 0.498* 
  (6.90) (1.86) (6.90) (1.955) (2.574) (1.942) 
RelativeTO  0.0912*** 0.0739*** 0.0910*** 0.0734*** 0.0921*** 0.0736*** 
  (12.97) (4.43) (12.95) (4.379) (5.062) (4.378) 
StateControl  0.0367*** 0.0349** 0.0365*** 0.0346** 0.0389** 0.0346** 
  (5.12) (2.23) (5.08) (2.214) (2.398) (2.204) 
Reform  -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0390*** -0.111*** 
  (-10.20) (-10.15) (-10.20) (-10.09) (-3.615) (-10.19) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.000119 0.000290 0.000137 
  (1.09) (0.49) (1.11) (0.544) (1.303) (0.618) 
Beta  -0.0086 0.0291* -0.0089 0.0266* -0.00835 0.0265 
  (-1.56) (1.77) (-1.61) (1.668) (-0.546) (1.658) 
FSI  -0.0068*** -0.0005 -0.0069*** -0.000437 -0.00647* -0.000482 
  (-8.01) (-0.26) (-8.03) (-0.233) (-1.729) (-0.258) 
ROA  -0.421*** -0.424* -0.420*** -0.469* -0.381 -0.471* 
  (-3.72) (-1.66) (-3.77) (-1.851) (-1.422) (-1.846) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0049*** 0.0037 0.0049*** 0.00396 0.00520 0.00387 
  (3.32) (1.19) (3.32) (1.273) (1.629) (1.231) 
TobinQ  -0.0410*** -0.0001 -0.0414*** -0.00198 -0.0402* -0.00201 
  (-4.64) (-0.0033) (-4.69) (-0.0948) (-1.699) (-0.0956) 
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Leverage  0.128*** 0.0704 0.128*** 0.0746 0.129* 0.0743 
  (6.44) (1.11) (6.47) (1.183) (1.747) (1.176) 
OwnershipC  0.0807** 0.135** 0.0830** 0.135** 0.0715 0.136** 
  (2.33) (2.14) (2.40) (2.159) (0.569) (2.162) 
CHOLD  -0.0198*** -0.0143 -0.0194*** -0.0138 -0.0184 -0.0139 
  (-2.79) (-0.69) (-2.74) (-0.660) (-0.783) (-0.662) 
CDUAL  -0.0281** -0.0142 -0.0282** -0.0138 -0.0298 -0.0138 
  (-2.19) (-0.48) (-2.20) (-0.462) (-1.014) (-0.458) 
BINDP  0.0159** 0.0141 0.0161** 0.0176 0.0143 0.0179 
  (2.20) (0.88) (2.22) (1.105) (0.766) (1.115) 
BSIZE  -0.0310*** -0.0107 -0.0314*** -0.0129 -0.0283 -0.0131 
  (-4.97) (-0.50) (-5.04) (-0.604) (-1.273) (-0.610) 
BMEET  -0.0093** -0.0030 -0.0093** -0.00232 -0.0109 -0.00229 
  (-2.34) (-0.27) (-2.34) (-0.206) (-0.943) (-0.202) 
constant 0.493*** -0.188*** -0.160 -0.188*** -0.172 -0.412 -0.167 
 (73.16) (-2.69) (-0.54) (-2.68) (-0.579) (-1.521) (-0.565) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0526 0.0527 0.11316 0.0533 0.1242 0.0322 0.1224 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A.  
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Correlation of SVI with good news, bad news and analyst following 
 
Panels A and B present the correlations of the average (median) attention from local (foreign) investors with Chinese (English) language good and bad news. Chinese 
(English) SVI is a proxy of local (foreign) investor attention. Panel C presents the correlations of the average (median) attention with the number of analysts following. 
 
    Panel A   Correlation of SVI with Chinese language good and bad news 
Dep. Var. Chinese Sum SVI Chinese Avg. SVI Chinese Med. SVI 
CGNEWS 0.1739***  0.0401***  0.0396***  
 (4.96)  (5.09)  (5.06)  
CBNEWS  0.1997  0.0472  0.0438 
  (1.13)  (1.15)  (1.09) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0108 0.0100 0.0110 0.0100 0.0106 0.0100 
Obs.  4,237 4,237 4,237 4,237 4,237 4,237 
    Panel B   Correlation of SVI with English language good and bad news 
Dep. Var. English Sum SVI English Avg. SVI English Med. SVI 
EGNEWS 0.7985  0.0933  0.2556  
 (0.809)  (0.13)  (0.31)  
EBNEWS  20.7203***  4.2445**  4.1698** 
  (2.72)  (2.70)  (2.61) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0140 0.0101 0.0131 0.0100 0.0136 0.0100 
Obs.  1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 
                     Panel C   Correlation of SVI with number of analysts following 
Dep. Var. Total Sum SVI  
(Chinese and English) 
 Total Avg. SVI 
(Chinese and English) 
 Total Med. SVI  
(Chinese and English) 
 
Analyst following 0.6329**  0.1460**  0.1446**  
 (2.37)  (2.35)  (2. 34)  
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 0.0377  0.0381  0.0378  
Obs.  1,064  1,064  1,064  
 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-
statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Information asymmetry and foreign share discount 
 
This table presents the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to 
English news and the foreign share discount for a firm. In Regressions (1) and (2), we use analyst following to proxy for 
information asymmetry. In Regressions (3) and (4), we use analyst forecast dispersion to proxy for information asymmetry. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression (1)   Regression (2)  Regression (3) Regression (4) 
Low following High following   High forecast dispersion Low forecast dispersion 
      
RGB_NEWS 0.00167 0.00637*  0.00187 0.00980* 
 (0.286) (1.823)  (0.262) (2.052) 
RelativeMV 0.418 0.570*  1.393*** 1.632*** 
 (1.036) (1.993)  (3.752) (3.483) 
RelativeTO 0.0825*** 0.0632***  -0.0502 -0.120 
 (3.630) (2.863)  (-1.086) (-1.162) 
StateControl 0.0120 0.0518**  -0.0711 -0.0410 
 (0.567) (2.491)  (-0.964) (-1.208) 
Reform -0.105*** -0.113***  0.0224 0.0571 
 (-7.634) (-4.933)  (0.548) (0.695) 
RelativeRET 0.000125 0.000255  0.00186 -0.00273* 
 (0.439) (0.702)  (1.299) (-2.004) 
Beta 0.0217 0.00967  -0.0838 0.0449 
 (1.468) (0.292)  (-0.863) (0.869) 
FSI -0.000389 -0.00103  0.00463 -0.00989 
 (-0.169) (-0.406)  (0.532) (-1.452) 
ROA -0.247 -0.629  -6.959*** -3.112** 
 (-1.058) (-1.011)  (-4.854) (-2.807) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.00108 0.00536  0.0470 0.0825 
 (0.227) (1.482)  (1.688) (1.649) 
TobinQ 0.0197 -0.0716*  -0.0851 0.0751 
 (0.884) (-1.707)  (-1.037) (0.769) 
Leverage 0.0347 0.122  -0.861*** -0.0699 
 (0.545) (1.286)  (-3.163) (-0.370) 
OwnershipC 0.126* 0.0718  0.698 0.669 
 (1.946) (0.243)  (0.876) (1.486) 
CHOLD -0.0121 -0.0215  0.0352 0.0833*** 
 (-0.344) (-0.832)  (0.678) (3.501) 
CDUAL -0.0446 0.00983  -0.0199 0.212*** 
 (-1.182) (0.313)  (-0.701) (4.207) 
BINDP -0.0218 0.0773***  -0.149*** -0.166** 
 (-1.101) (3.147)  (-4.426) (-2.411) 
BSIZE 0.0337 -0.0632**  0.0375 0.0424 
 (1.185) (-2.555)  (1.043) (0.733) 
BMEET -0.00178 -0.0164  0.0292 0.0497* 
 (-0.125) (-1.016)  (0.921) (1.770) 
Constant -0.0674 -0.193  -0.371 -1.364** 
 (-0.148) (-0.566)  (-0.786) (-2.106) 
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0236 0.2253  0.2357 0.1388 
Obs. 2,224 1,994  2,091 2,127 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
  
 55 
Table 6. Regression results based on change-in-change 
 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign 
share discount. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
      
RGB_NEWS 0.0097*** 0.0100*** 0.0097*** 0.0100*** 0.0096*** 
 (3.88) (4.06) (3.98) (4.06) (3.86) 
RelativeMV  0.0025 -0.0038 0.0190 -0.0047 
  (0.34) (-0.09) (0.54) (-0.12) 
RelativeTO  0.0552*** 0.0565*** 0.0555*** 0.0563*** 
  (4.86) (4.91) (4.86) (4.96) 
StateControl  -0.0006 -0.0025 0.0001 -0.0024 
  (-0.35) (-0.76) (0.03) (-0.69) 
Reform  -0.0102*** -0.0417*** -0.0126*** -0.0414*** 
  (-4.63) (-4.87) (-4.44) (-4.81) 
RelativeRET  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.66) (0.67) (0.66) (0.64) 
Beta  -0.0007 0.0021 -0.0016 0.0025 
  (-0.36) (0.79) (-0.67) (0.91) 
FSI  -0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 
  (-0.53) (1.08) (0.05) (1.00) 
ROA  0.0053 -0.0327 0.0066 -0.0318 
  (0.15) (-0.60) (0.15) (-0.56) 
∆SalesGrowth  -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 
  (-0.64) (0.38) (-0.52) (0.26) 
TobinQ  -0.0063* -0.0015 -0.0093** -0.0024 
  (-1.91) (-0.34) (-2.40) (-0.50) 
Leverage  0.0000 0.0024 0.0265*** 0.0019 
  (0.00) (0.18) (2.81) (0.14) 
OwnershipC  -0.0021 -0.0266* -0.0399** -0.0272* 
  (-0.43) (-1.90) (-2.47) (-1.94) 
CHOLD  0.0019 -0.0001 0.0015 0.0003 
  (1.23) (-0.03) (0.34) (0.06) 
CDUAL  -0.0086 -0.0089 -0.0144** -0.0088 
  (-1.60) (-1.54) (-2.35) (-1.50) 
BINDP  -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0041 -0.0007 
  (-0.85) (-0.13) (-1.35) (-0.21) 
BSIZE  -0.0019 0.0028 -0.0013 0.0027 
  (-1.18) (0.83) (-0.38) (0.76) 
BMEET  0.0018 0.0022 0.0012 0.0022 
  (1.31) (1.06) (0.61) (1.04) 
Constant 0.0011 0.0075 0.0454 -0.0139 0.0434 
 (1.17) (0.82) (0.95) (-0.35) (0.92) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0067 0.0313 0.0320 0.0250 0.0435 
Obs. 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432 
 
*, ** and*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Regression results based on PSM 
 
This table presents the robustness test on the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English 
news on the foreign share discount. We use a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching based on year, 
month, industry, region, firm and board characteristics. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
      
RGB_NEWS 0.0103*** 0.0089** 0.0073** 0.0099** 0.0077** 
 (2.90) (2.30) (2.23) (2.52) (2.30) 
RelativeMV  0.1168 0.2675 0.3611 0.2798 
  (0.63) (0.93) (1.20) (0.99) 
RelativeTO  0.0774*** 0.0664*** 0.0800*** 0.0682*** 
  (2.88) (2.95) (3.01) (2.99) 
StateControl  0.0213 0.0298* 0.0278 0.0280 
  (1.32) (1.70) (1.49) (1.58) 
Reform  -0.0253** -0.1127*** -0.0266** -0.1140*** 
  (-2.12) (-7.93) (-2.13) (-7.65) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 
  (0.66) (0.38) (0.76) (0.51) 
Beta  -0.0142 0.0330 -0.0157 0.0331 
  (-0.70) (1.40) (-0.72) (1.40) 
FSI  -0.0154*** -0.0030 -0.0145*** -0.0029 
  (-4.46) (-1.19) (-4.27) (-1.16) 
ROA  -0.7522 -0.7692* -0.6151 -0.7729* 
  (-1.46) (-1.70) (-1.11) (-1.73) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0070*** 0.0071*** 0.0078*** 0.0065*** 
  (3.25) (2.79) (3.31) (2.89) 
TobinQ  -0.0507* 0.0068 -0.0474 0.0072 
  (-1.72) (0.26) (-1.60) (0.27) 
Leverage  0.1397*** 0.0212 0.1516 0.0205 
  (2.82) (0.24) (1.66) (0.23) 
OwnershipC  -0.0493 0.0120 -0.1040 0.0280 
  (-0.39) (0.13) (-0.49) (0.31) 
CHOLD  -0.0248 -0.0068 -0.0183 -0.0094 
  (-1.12) (-0.35) (-0.70) (-0.49) 
CDUAL  -0.0340 0.0038 -0.0357 0.0057 
  (-1.59) (0.18) (-1.61) (0.27) 
BINDP  0.0286 0.0127 0.0210 0.0114 
  (0.85) (0.53) (0.62) (0.47) 
BSIZE  -0.0543** -0.0277 -0.0505* -0.0277 
  (-2.15) (-1.04) (-1.78) (-1.05) 
BMEET  -0.0181 -0.0068 -0.0200 -0.0047 
  (-1.28) (-0.53) (-1.36) (-0.37) 
Constant 0.4737*** 0.2037 0.1278 -0.1029 0.1189 
 (72.48) (0.96) (0.39) (-0.30) (0.37) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1283 0.0797 0.2072 0.0379 0.2152 
Obs. 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-
tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 8.                    Regression results based on the use of the natural log of  
                                       the dependent and the main independent variable 
 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign share discount, 
using the natural log of ForeignDiscount as the dependent variable and the natural log of RGB_NEWS as the main 
independent variable. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
Ln_ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression  
(5) 
      
Ln_RGB_NEWS 0.0106** 0.0081* 0.0073* 0.0080* 0.0073* 
 (2.37) (1.91) (1.74) (1.90) (1.73) 
RelativeMV  0.6247 1.1371 0.6436 1.1338 
  (0.98) (1.29) (0.99) (1.28) 
RelativeTO  0.2078*** 0.2155*** 0.2089*** 0.2161*** 
  (4.23) (4.36) (4.25) (4.37) 
StateControl  0.0908** 0.0954** 0.0909** 0.0953** 
  (2.52) (2.57) (2.53) (2.56) 
Reform  -0.0719** -0.0769** -0.0722** -0.0771** 
  (-2.26) (-2.32) (-2.27) (-2.32) 
RelativeRET  0.0014 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 
  (1.25) (1.29) (1.25) (1.28) 
Beta  -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0029 
  (-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.06) 
FSI  -0.0144 -0.0133 -0.0144 -0.0133 
  (-1.02) (-0.95) (-1.01) (-0.95) 
ROA  -1.3932** -1.2287* -1.3864** -1.2315* 
  (-2.07) (-1.92) (-2.06) (-1.92) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0120* 0.0126* 0.0120* 0.0126* 
  (1.75) (1.81) (1.75) (1.80) 
TobinQ  -0.1007 -0.0982 -0.0999 -0.0976 
  (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.45) 
Leverage  0.3624** 0.4023** 0.3637** 0.4019** 
  (2.38) (2.00) (2.36) (2.00) 
OwnershipC  0.1570 0.1064 0.1537 0.1050 
  (0.46) (0.25) (0.44) (0.24) 
CHOLD  -0.1123* -0.1100 -0.1120* -0.1098 
  (-1.73) (-1.63) (-1.72) (-1.62) 
CDUAL  -0.0794 -0.0885 -0.0797 -0.0883 
  (-0.97) (-1.06) (-0.98) (-1.06) 
BINDP  0.0876 0.0814 0.0868 0.0809 
  (1.43) (1.34) (1.42) (1.33) 
BSIZE  -0.1483** -0.1397* -0.1476** -0.1393* 
  (-1.98) (-1.80) (-1.97) (-1.79) 
BMEET  -0.0306 -0.0363 -0.0313 -0.0367 
  (-0.81) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-0.96) 
constant -0.9219*** -1.9959*** -2.6012** -2.0240*** -2.6033** 
 (-367.35) (-2.80) (-2.61) (-2.81) (-2.61) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0167 0.0656 0.0429 0.0648 0.0432 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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Appendix A. 
 
Definitions of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
  
ForeignDiscount 
 
 
 
ForeignDiscounti,t represents the discount in B-shares of firm i at the end of month 
t. It is defined as the price of A-shares minus the price of B-shares divided by the 
price of A-shares. 
 
RGB_NEWS 
 
 
 
 
 
RGB_NEWSi,t is the ratio of Chinese language good to bad news over the ratio of 
English language good to bad news, divided by 100. The ratio of Chinese 
(English) language good to bad news is the number of Chinese (English) good 
news reports over the number of Chinese (English) bad news reports.  
 
RelativeMV 
 
RelativeMVi,t−1 is defined as the market capitalization of A-shares divided by that 
of B-shares at the end of the previous month.   
 
RelativeTO 
 
 
RelativeTOi,t−1 is defined as the turnover of A-shares divided by that of B-shares 
at the end of the previous month. 
 
StateControl 
 
 
StateControli,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is state-controlled, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Reform 
 
 
Reformi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the year of and the years after Split 
Share Structure Reform, and 0 for the years before this reform. 
 
RelativeRET 
 
 
RelativeRETi,t−1 is defined as the stock returns of A-shares divided by that of B-
shares in the previous month. 
 
Beta 
 
 
 
Betai,t−1  is defined as the beta in CAPM in the previous year. We estimate it by 
regressing the daily excess return of each firm on daily excess returns of the 
market for the past year. 
 
FSI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FSIi,t−1 is defined as the change in the residual variance of the informativeness of 
share price in the previous year. Following the method employed in Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2008), we first obtain the R-square (i.e. goodness of fit) by regressing 
the weekly excess returns of each firm on both Chinese and US weekly market 
excess returns. We then calculate the natural log of the ratio of (1-R-square) to R-
square as the value of this variable. 
 
ROA 
 
 
 
ROAi,t−1 represents the return on assets based on industry median adjustment in 
the last fiscal year. It is defined as the ratio of operating income to total assets. 
 
∆SalesGrowth 
 
 
∆SalesGrowthi,t−1 is defined as the change of sales growth in percentage in the last 
fiscal year. 
 
TobinQ 
 
 
TobinQi,t−1 represents the Tobin’s Q of the firm. It is calculated as the ratio of the 
sum of debt and market value to total equity in the last fiscal year.  
 
Leverage 
 
Leveragei,t−1 is the ratio of debt to equity of the last fiscal year. 
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OwnershipC 
 
 
 
OwnershipCi,t−1 represents the concentration of ownership in the last fiscal year. It 
is proxied by the Herfindahl index, which considers the holdings of the firm’s ten 
largest shareholders.  
 
CHOLD 
 
 
 
CHOLDi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the shareholding of a CEO in a firm 
falls in the top 25 percent or the bottom 25 percent of cross-sectional 
shareholdings of CEOs in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
CDUAL 
 
 
CDUALi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO of a firm was also the chair 
of the board in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
BINDP 
 
 
 
BINDPi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the proportion of independent 
directors on the board was higher than the cross-sectional median proportion in 
the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
BSIZE 
 
 
BSIZEi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board size of a firm in the last 
fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median board size, and 0 otherwise. 
 
BMEET 
 
 
 
BMEETi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board meetings of a 
firm in the last fiscal year was greater than the cross-sectional median number of 
board meetings, and 0 otherwise. 
 
CGNEWS 
 
 
 
CGNEWSi,t is defined as the number of Chinese good news reports divided by 
100 in Equation (2) and Table (3). It is defined as the number of Chinese good 
news reports in Table (4) and Appendix E. 
 
EBNEWS 
 
 
EBNEWSi,t is defined as the number of English bad news reports divided by 100 
in Equation (2) and Table (3). It is defined as the number of English bad news 
reports in Table (4) and Appendix E. 
  
CBNEWS 
 
CBNEWSi,t is defined as the number of Chinese bad news reports in Table (4). 
 
EGNEWS 
 
EGNEWSi,t is defined as the number of English good news reports in Table (4). 
 
Analyst following 
 
The natural log of the number of analysts following multiplied by 100. 
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Appendix B.  
        The effect of the ratio of Chinese to English news reports 
 
This table presents the potential effect of the ratio of Chinese to English news reports on the relationship between the 
ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news and the foreign share discount for a firm.  
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) 
Low-ratio High-ratio Low-ratio High-ratio 
     
RGB_NEWS 1.0401** 0.0148*** 1.0874* 0.0093*** 
 (2.48) (3.81) (1.94) (2.98) 
RelativeMV 0.4863*** 0.1119 0.5155* 0.4123 
 (2.79) (0.60) (1.98) (1.43) 
RelativeTO 0.0908*** 0.0694*** 0.0676*** 0.0665*** 
 (4.96) (2.76) (4.26) (3.18) 
StateControl 0.0334* 0.0166 0.0308* 0.0229 
 (1.81) (0.91) (1.76) (1.08) 
Reform -0.0510*** -0.0065 -0.1123*** -0.1035*** 
 (-4.73) (-0.50) (-8.41) (-6.88) 
RelativeRET 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0004 
 (0.28) (0.85) (-0.39) (0.95) 
Beta -0.0004 -0.0128 0.0292* 0.0334 
 (-0.02) (-0.68) (1.83) (1.63) 
FSI -0.0060* -0.0093* -0.0004 0.0006 
 (-1.65) (-1.80) (-0.23) (0.21) 
ROA -0.2870 -0.9251** -0.2625 -0.8417** 
 (-1.03) (-2.04) (-1.00) (-2.39) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.0045 0.0053* 0.0029 0.0057** 
 (1.12) (1.86) (0.77) (2.36) 
TobinQ -0.0369 -0.0421 -0.0059 0.0112 
 (-1.54) (-1.47) (-0.31) (0.45) 
Leverage 0.1003* 0.1146** 0.0462 0.0364 
 (1.70) (2.10) (0.76) (0.39) 
OwnershipC 0.1003 0.0345 0.1186* 0.0764 
 (0.92) (0.36) (1.67) (1.03) 
CHOLD -0.0115 -0.0463** -0.0106 -0.0181 
 (-0.50) (-2.29) (-0.48) (-0.76) 
CDUAL -0.0232 -0.0418* -0.0213 -0.0047 
 (-0.75) (-1.76) (-0.70) (-0.18) 
BINDP 0.0102 0.0147 0.0109 -0.0036 
 (0.53) (0.44) (0.65) (-0.15) 
BSIZE -0.0249 -0.0394 -0.0050 -0.0104 
 (-1.08) (-1.55) (-0.22) (-0.39) 
BMEET -0.0035 -0.0164 -0.0026 -0.0003 
 (-0.33) (-0.99) (-0.24) (-0.02) 
Constant -0.2714 0.2002 -0.1758 -0.0588 
 (-1.35) (0.95) (-0.58) (-0.18) 
     
Firm fixed effects No No Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0633 0.0668 0.0926 0.1362 
Obs. 2,785 1,433 2,785 1,433 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Appendix C.  
The effect of state ownership 
 
This table presents the potential effect of state ownership on the relationship between the ratio of 
favouritism in Chinese to English news and the foreign share discount for a firm.  
 
Dep. Var.= ForeignDiscount Regression (1) 
Non-state-controlled firms 
Regression (2) 
State-controlled firms 
   
RGB_NEWS 0.0077 0.0066* 
 (1.19) (1.88) 
RelativeMV 0.4671 0.4891 
 (1.35) (1.53) 
RelativeTO 0.0174 0.0979*** 
 (0.99) (5.96) 
Reform -0.0613*** -0.1202*** 
 (-2.87) (-10.51) 
RelativeRET 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (1.63) (-0.44) 
Beta 0.0393 0.0334** 
 (0.86) (2.07) 
FSI 0.0087*** -0.0037 
 (2.98) (-1.55) 
ROA 0.3205 -0.5027 
 (0.45) (-1.63) 
∆SalesGrowth -0.0139** 0.0065*** 
 (-2.31) (3.94) 
TobinQ 0.0486 0.0002 
 (0.56) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.0462 0.0709 
 (0.34) (0.99) 
OwnershipC 0.7366 0.1296* 
 (1.19) (1.76) 
CHOLD 0.0734** -0.0196 
 (2.40) (-0.90) 
CDUAL -0.0101 0.0164 
 (-0.53) (0.58) 
BINDP -0.0046 0.0212 
 (-0.12) (1.22) 
BSIZE -0.0039 -0.0124 
 (-0.09) (-0.50) 
BMEET -0.0125 -0.0002 
 (-0.54) (-0.01) 
Constant -0.2039 -0.1678 
 (-0.49) (-0.46) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0155 0.2014 
Obs. 873 3,345 
 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Appendix D.1.  
The impact of the ratio of favouritism on the foreign share discount 
(Using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership) 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign 
share discount, using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership (CeoHolding). CeoHolding is the 
proportion of shares held by the CEO. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression  
(1) 
Regression  
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
     
RGB_NEWS 0.0094** 0.0075** 0.0102** 0.0075** 
 (2.32) (2.18) (2.50) (2.13) 
RelativeMV 0.4268** 0.4895* 0.6076** 0.4885* 
 (2.22) (1.88) (2.50) (1.87) 
RelativeTO 0.0915*** 0.0737*** 0.0925*** 0.0740*** 
 (4.84) (4.42) (5.14) (4.43) 
StateControl 0.0360** 0.0336** 0.0382** 0.0337** 
 (2.29) (2.11) (2.32) (2.10) 
Reform -0.0381*** -0.1100*** -0.0395*** -0.1107*** 
 (-3.56) (-10.08) (-3.60) (-10.19) 
RelativeRET 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
 (1.19) (0.48) (1.25) (0.56) 
Beta -0.0085 0.0270* -0.0080 0.0269* 
 (-0.56) (1.68) (-0.52) (1.67) 
FSI -0.0067* -0.0002 -0.0063* -0.0003 
 (-1.79) (-0.13) (-1.74) (-0.15) 
ROA -0.4384 -0.4846* -0.4017 -0.4866* 
 (-1.58) (-1.89) (-1.47) (-1.88) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.0057* 0.0045 0.0059* 0.0044 
 (1.84) (1.46) (1.92) (1.42) 
TobinQ -0.0395* -0.0005 -0.0384 -0.0005 
 (-1.66) (-0.03) (-1.62) (-0.02) 
Leverage 0.1241** 0.0710 0.1238* 0.0707 
 (2.14) (1.12) (1.67) (1.11) 
OwnershipC 0.0882 0.1379** 0.0750 0.1386** 
 (0.83) (2.18) (0.60) (2.18) 
CeoHolding -4.5792 -4.8901 -4.4921 -4.8972 
 (-0.36) (-0.63) (-0.35) (-0.63) 
CDUAL -0.0302 -0.0153 -0.0316 -0.0152 
 (-1.10) (-0.54) (-1.12) (-0.54) 
BINDP 0.0157 0.0176 0.0140 0.0179 
 (0.84) (1.10) (0.75) (1.11) 
BSIZE -0.0319 -0.0135 -0.0291 -0.0137 
 (-1.48) (-0.63) (-1.30) (-0.64) 
BMEET -0.0105 -0.0032 -0.0119 -0.0031 
 (-0.92) (-0.28) (-1.03) (-0.27) 
Constant -0.2004 -0.1628 -0.4066 -0.1588 
 (-0.92) (-0.54) (-1.48) (-0.53) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0482 0.1224 0.0298 0.1243 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Appendix D.2.  
The impact of the number of Chinese and English news reports on the foreign share discount  
(Using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership)  
 
This table presents the impact of the number of Chinese and foreign news reports on the foreign share discount, using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership 
(CeoHolding). CeoHolding is the proportion of shares held by the CEO. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression  
(1) 
Regression  
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Regression 
 (5) 
Regression  
(6) 
       
CGNEWS 0.0085** 0.0075* 0.0074* 0.0067* 0.0085** 0.0066 
 (1.98) (1.88) (1.78) (1.69) (2.03) (1.66) 
EBNEWS 0.7343 0.5475 0.2092 0.1736 0.3289 0.1866 
 (1.35) (1.49) (0.39) (0.47) (0.59) (0.49) 
CGNEWS*EBNEWS   2.0587** 1.4652* 2.0295* 1.4833* 
   (1.97) (1.80) (1.97) (1.85) 
RelativeMV 0.4153** 0.4924* 0.4159** 0.4915* 0.6086** 0.4906* 
 (2.20) (1.90) (2.20) (1.89) (2.51) (1.88) 
RelativeTO 0.0915*** 0.0739*** 0.0912*** 0.0737*** 0.0924*** 0.0739*** 
 (4.82) (4.44) (4.81) (4.42) (5.14) (4.42) 
StateControl 0.0355** 0.0334** 0.0353** 0.0332** 0.0376** 0.0333** 
 (2.27) (2.09) (2.26) (2.08) (2.30) (2.07) 
Reform -0.0381*** -0.1104*** -0.0380*** -0.1100*** -0.0397*** -0.1106*** 
 (-3.56) (-10.18) (-3.56) (-10.10) (-3.62) (-10.21) 
RelativeRET 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
 (1.20) (0.49) (1.21) (0.50) (1.28) (0.58) 
Beta -0.0084 0.0270* -0.0087 0.0268* -0.0082 0.0267 
 (-0.55) (1.69) (-0.57) (1.67) (-0.53) (1.66) 
FSI -0.0067* -0.0002 -0.0067* -0.0003 -0.0063* -0.0003 
 (-1.79) (-0.12) (-1.79) (-0.14) (-1.74) (-0.16) 
 64 
ROA -0.4407 -0.4837* -0.4386 -0.4821* -0.3986 -0.4841* 
 (-1.58) (-1.88) (-1.58) (-1.88) (-1.47) (-1.87) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.0057* 0.0045 0.0057* 0.0045 0.0059* 0.0044 
 (1.84) (1.47) (1.84) (1.46) (1.92) (1.41) 
TobinQ -0.0391 -0.0000 -0.0396* -0.0005 -0.0384 -0.0005 
 (-1.64) (-0.00) (-1.67) (-0.02) (-1.62) (-0.02) 
Leverage 0.1238** 0.0707 0.1244** 0.0715 0.1243* 0.0712 
 (2.17) (1.12) (2.19) (1.13) (1.68) (1.13) 
OwnershipC 0.0849 0.1339** 0.0871 0.1357** 0.0723 0.1365** 
 (0.81) (2.12) (0.83) (2.15) (0.58) (2.15) 
CeoHolding -4.6716 -4.9788 -4.5727 -4.8962 -4.5047 -4.9019 
 (-0.37) (-0.64) (-0.36) (-0.63) (-0.35) (-0.63) 
CDUAL -0.0304 -0.0154 -0.0305 -0.0155 -0.0319 -0.0154 
 (-1.11) (-0.54) (-1.11) (-0.54) (-1.13) (-0.54) 
BINDP 0.0156 0.0174 0.0158 0.0175 0.0140 0.0177 
 (0.84) (1.09) (0.84) (1.10) (0.74) (1.11) 
BSIZE -0.0319 -0.0132 -0.0323 -0.0136 -0.0292 -0.0138 
 (-1.49) (-0.62) (-1.50) (-0.63) (-1.31) (-0.64) 
BMEET -0.0104 -0.0032 -0.0103 -0.0031 -0.0118 -0.0031 
 (-0.92) (-0.28) (-0.91) (-0.28) (-1.03) (-0.27) 
constant -0.1871 -0.1655 -0.1872 -0.1646 -0.4066 -0.1603 
 (-0.87) (-0.55) (-0.87) (-0.55) (-1.48) (-0.53) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.0480 0.1199 0.0486 0.1206 0.0287 0.1225 
Obs. 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
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Appendix E. 
The impact of the number of Chinese and English news reports on the foreign share discount 
(Using unscaled main independent variables) 
 
This table presents the impact of the number of Chinese and foreign news reports on the foreign share discount, using unscaled main independent variables. 
  
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
(6) 
Regression 
(7) 
CGNEWS 0.0001* 0.0001*** 0.0001* 0.0001*** 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001 
 (1.79) (3.16) (1.85) (2.71) (1.691) (2.031) (1.654) 
EBNEWS 0.0039 0.0074 0.0053 0.0022 0.0017 0.0034 0.0018 
 (0.78) (1.24) (1.54) (0.35) (0.462) (0.606) (0.497) 
CGNEWS*EBNEW    0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0002* 0.0001* 
    (2.32) (1.760) (1.886) (1.803) 
RelativeMV  0.419*** 0.478* 0.419*** 0.499* 0.615** 0.498* 
  (6.90) (1.86) (6.90) (1.955) (2.574) (1.942) 
RelativeTO  0.0912*** 0.0739*** 0.0910*** 0.0734*** 0.0921*** 0.0736*** 
  (12.97) (4.43) (12.95) (4.379) (5.062) (4.378) 
StateControl  0.0367*** 0.0349** 0.0365*** 0.0346** 0.0389** 0.0346** 
  (5.12) (2.23) (5.08) (2.214) (2.398) (2.204) 
Reform  -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0390*** -0.111*** 
  (-10.20) (-10.15) (-10.20) (-10.09) (-3.615) (-10.19) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.000119 0.000290 0.000137 
  (1.09) (0.49) (1.11) (0.544) (1.303) (0.618) 
Beta  -0.0086 0.0291* -0.0089 0.0266* -0.00835 0.0265 
  (-1.56) (1.77) (-1.61) (1.668) (-0.546) (1.658) 
FSI  -0.0068*** -0.0005 -0.0069*** -0.000437 -0.00647* -0.000482 
  (-8.01) (-0.26) (-8.03) (-0.233) (-1.729) (-0.258) 
ROA  -0.421*** -0.424* -0.420*** -0.469* -0.381 -0.471* 
  (-3.72) (-1.66) (-3.77) (-1.851) (-1.422) (-1.846) 
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∆SalesGrowth  0.0049*** 0.0037 0.0049*** 0.00396 0.00520 0.00387 
  (3.32) (1.19) (3.32) (1.273) (1.629) (1.231) 
TobinQ  -0.0410*** -0.0001 -0.0414*** -0.00198 -0.0402* -0.00201 
  (-4.64) (-0.0033) (-4.69) (-0.0948) (-1.699) (-0.0956) 
Leverage  0.128*** 0.0704 0.128*** 0.0746 0.129* 0.0743 
  (6.44) (1.11) (6.47) (1.183) (1.747) (1.176) 
OwnershipC  0.0807** 0.135** 0.0830** 0.135** 0.0715 0.136** 
  (2.33) (2.14) (2.40) (2.159) (0.569) (2.162) 
CHOLD  -0.0198*** -0.0143 -0.0194*** -0.0138 -0.0184 -0.0139 
  (-2.79) (-0.69) (-2.74) (-0.660) (-0.783) (-0.662) 
CDUAL  -0.0281** -0.0142 -0.0282** -0.0138 -0.0298 -0.0138 
  (-2.19) (-0.48) (-2.20) (-0.462) (-1.014) (-0.458) 
BINDP  0.0159** 0.0141 0.0161** 0.0176 0.0143 0.0179 
  (2.20) (0.88) (2.22) (1.105) (0.766) (1.115) 
BSIZE  -0.0310*** -0.0107 -0.0314*** -0.0129 -0.0283 -0.0131 
  (-4.97) (-0.50) (-5.04) (-0.604) (-1.273) (-0.610) 
BMEET  -0.0093** -0.0030 -0.0093** -0.00232 -0.0109 -0.00229 
  (-2.34) (-0.27) (-2.34) (-0.206) (-0.943) (-0.202) 
constant 0.493*** -0.188*** -0.160 -0.188*** -0.172 -0.412 -0.167 
 (73.16) (-2.69) (-0.54) (-2.68) (-0.579) (-1.521) (-0.565) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0526 0.0527 0.11316 0.0533 0.1242 0.0322 0.1224 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A.  
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Appendix A. 
 
Definitions of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
  
ForeignDiscount 
 
 
 
ForeignDiscounti,t represents the discount in B-shares of firm i at the end of month 
t. It is defined as the price of A-shares minus the price of B-shares divided by the 
price of A-shares. 
 
RGB_NEWS 
 
 
 
 
 
RGB_NEWSi,t is the ratio of Chinese language good to bad news over the ratio of 
English language good to bad news, divided by 100. The ratio of Chinese 
(English) language good to bad news is the number of Chinese (English) good 
news reports over the number of Chinese (English) bad news reports.  
 
RelativeMV 
 
RelativeMVi,t−1 is defined as the market capitalization of A-shares divided by that 
of B-shares at the end of the previous month.   
 
RelativeTO 
 
 
RelativeTOi,t−1 is defined as the turnover of A-shares divided by that of B-shares 
at the end of the previous month. 
 
StateControl 
 
 
StateControli,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is state-controlled, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Reform 
 
 
Reformi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the year of and the years after Split 
Share Structure Reform, and 0 for the years before this reform. 
 
RelativeRET 
 
 
RelativeRETi,t−1 is defined as the stock returns of A-shares divided by that of B-
shares in the previous month. 
 
Beta 
 
 
 
Betai,t−1  is defined as the beta in CAPM in the previous year. We estimate it by 
regressing the daily excess return of each firm on daily excess returns of the 
market for the past year. 
 
FSI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FSIi,t−1 is defined as the change in the residual variance of the informativeness of 
share price in the previous year. Following the method employed in Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2008), we first obtain the R-square (i.e. goodness of fit) by regressing 
the weekly excess returns of each firm on both Chinese and US weekly market 
excess returns. We then calculate the natural log of the ratio of (1-R-square) to R-
square as the value of this variable. 
 
ROA 
 
 
 
ROAi,t−1 represents the return on assets based on industry median adjustment in 
the last fiscal year. It is defined as the ratio of operating income to total assets. 
 
∆SalesGrowth 
 
 
∆SalesGrowthi,t−1 is defined as the change of sales growth in percentage in the last 
fiscal year. 
 
TobinQ 
 
 
TobinQi,t−1 represents the Tobin’s Q of the firm. It is calculated as the ratio of the 
sum of debt and market value to total equity in the last fiscal year.  
 
Leverage 
 
Leveragei,t−1 is the ratio of debt to equity of the last fiscal year. 
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OwnershipC 
 
 
 
OwnershipCi,t−1 represents the concentration of ownership in the last fiscal year. It 
is proxied by the Herfindahl index, which considers the holdings of the firm’s ten 
largest shareholders.  
 
CHOLD 
 
 
 
CHOLDi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the shareholding of a CEO in a firm 
falls in the top 25 percent or the bottom 25 percent of cross-sectional 
shareholdings of CEOs in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
CDUAL 
 
 
CDUALi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO of a firm was also the chair 
of the board in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
BINDP 
 
 
 
BINDPi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the proportion of independent 
directors on the board was higher than the cross-sectional median proportion in 
the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
BSIZE 
 
 
BSIZEi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board size of a firm in the last 
fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median board size, and 0 otherwise. 
 
BMEET 
 
 
 
BMEETi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board meetings of a 
firm in the last fiscal year was greater than the cross-sectional median number of 
board meetings, and 0 otherwise. 
 
CGNEWS 
 
 
 
CGNEWSi,t is defined as the number of Chinese good news reports divided by 
100 in Equation (2) and Table (3). It is defined as the number of Chinese good 
news reports in Table (4) and Appendix E. 
 
EBNEWS 
 
 
EBNEWSi,t is defined as the number of English bad news reports divided by 100 
in Equation (2) and Table (3). It is defined as the number of English bad news 
reports in Table (4) and Appendix E. 
  
CBNEWS 
 
CBNEWSi,t is defined as the number of Chinese bad news reports in Table (4). 
 
EGNEWS 
 
EGNEWSi,t is defined as the number of English good news reports in Table (4). 
 
Analyst following 
 
The natural log of the number of analysts following multiplied by 100. 
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Appendix B.  
        The effect of the ratio of Chinese to English news reports 
 
This table presents the potential effect of the ratio of Chinese to English news reports on the relationship between the 
ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news and the foreign share discount for a firm.  
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) 
Low-ratio High-ratio Low-ratio High-ratio 
     
RGB_NEWS 1.0401** 0.0148*** 1.0874* 0.0093*** 
 (2.48) (3.81) (1.94) (2.98) 
RelativeMV 0.4863*** 0.1119 0.5155* 0.4123 
 (2.79) (0.60) (1.98) (1.43) 
RelativeTO 0.0908*** 0.0694*** 0.0676*** 0.0665*** 
 (4.96) (2.76) (4.26) (3.18) 
StateControl 0.0334* 0.0166 0.0308* 0.0229 
 (1.81) (0.91) (1.76) (1.08) 
Reform -0.0510*** -0.0065 -0.1123*** -0.1035*** 
 (-4.73) (-0.50) (-8.41) (-6.88) 
RelativeRET 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0004 
 (0.28) (0.85) (-0.39) (0.95) 
Beta -0.0004 -0.0128 0.0292* 0.0334 
 (-0.02) (-0.68) (1.83) (1.63) 
FSI -0.0060* -0.0093* -0.0004 0.0006 
 (-1.65) (-1.80) (-0.23) (0.21) 
ROA -0.2870 -0.9251** -0.2625 -0.8417** 
 (-1.03) (-2.04) (-1.00) (-2.39) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.0045 0.0053* 0.0029 0.0057** 
 (1.12) (1.86) (0.77) (2.36) 
TobinQ -0.0369 -0.0421 -0.0059 0.0112 
 (-1.54) (-1.47) (-0.31) (0.45) 
Leverage 0.1003* 0.1146** 0.0462 0.0364 
 (1.70) (2.10) (0.76) (0.39) 
OwnershipC 0.1003 0.0345 0.1186* 0.0764 
 (0.92) (0.36) (1.67) (1.03) 
CHOLD -0.0115 -0.0463** -0.0106 -0.0181 
 (-0.50) (-2.29) (-0.48) (-0.76) 
CDUAL -0.0232 -0.0418* -0.0213 -0.0047 
 (-0.75) (-1.76) (-0.70) (-0.18) 
BINDP 0.0102 0.0147 0.0109 -0.0036 
 (0.53) (0.44) (0.65) (-0.15) 
BSIZE -0.0249 -0.0394 -0.0050 -0.0104 
 (-1.08) (-1.55) (-0.22) (-0.39) 
BMEET -0.0035 -0.0164 -0.0026 -0.0003 
 (-0.33) (-0.99) (-0.24) (-0.02) 
Constant -0.2714 0.2002 -0.1758 -0.0588 
 (-1.35) (0.95) (-0.58) (-0.18) 
     
Firm fixed effects No No Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0633 0.0668 0.0926 0.1362 
Obs. 2,785 1,433 2,785 1,433 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Appendix C.  
The effect of state ownership 
 
This table presents the potential effect of state ownership on the relationship between the ratio of 
favouritism in Chinese to English news and the foreign share discount for a firm.  
 
Dep. Var.= ForeignDiscount Regression (1) 
Non-state-controlled firms 
Regression (2) 
State-controlled firms 
   
RGB_NEWS 0.0077 0.0066* 
 (1.19) (1.88) 
RelativeMV 0.4671 0.4891 
 (1.35) (1.53) 
RelativeTO 0.0174 0.0979*** 
 (0.99) (5.96) 
Reform -0.0613*** -0.1202*** 
 (-2.87) (-10.51) 
RelativeRET 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (1.63) (-0.44) 
Beta 0.0393 0.0334** 
 (0.86) (2.07) 
FSI 0.0087*** -0.0037 
 (2.98) (-1.55) 
ROA 0.3205 -0.5027 
 (0.45) (-1.63) 
∆SalesGrowth -0.0139** 0.0065*** 
 (-2.31) (3.94) 
TobinQ 0.0486 0.0002 
 (0.56) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.0462 0.0709 
 (0.34) (0.99) 
OwnershipC 0.7366 0.1296* 
 (1.19) (1.76) 
CHOLD 0.0734** -0.0196 
 (2.40) (-0.90) 
CDUAL -0.0101 0.0164 
 (-0.53) (0.58) 
BINDP -0.0046 0.0212 
 (-0.12) (1.22) 
BSIZE -0.0039 -0.0124 
 (-0.09) (-0.50) 
BMEET -0.0125 -0.0002 
 (-0.54) (-0.01) 
Constant -0.2039 -0.1678 
 (-0.49) (-0.46) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0155 0.2014 
Obs. 873 3,345 
 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Appendix D.1.  
The impact of the ratio of favouritism on the foreign share discount 
(Using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership) 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign 
share discount, using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership (CeoHolding). CeoHolding is the 
proportion of shares held by the CEO. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression  
(1) 
Regression  
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
     
RGB_NEWS 0.0094** 0.0075** 0.0102** 0.0075** 
 (2.32) (2.18) (2.50) (2.13) 
RelativeMV 0.4268** 0.4895* 0.6076** 0.4885* 
 (2.22) (1.88) (2.50) (1.87) 
RelativeTO 0.0915*** 0.0737*** 0.0925*** 0.0740*** 
 (4.84) (4.42) (5.14) (4.43) 
StateControl 0.0360** 0.0336** 0.0382** 0.0337** 
 (2.29) (2.11) (2.32) (2.10) 
Reform -0.0381*** -0.1100*** -0.0395*** -0.1107*** 
 (-3.56) (-10.08) (-3.60) (-10.19) 
RelativeRET 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
 (1.19) (0.48) (1.25) (0.56) 
Beta -0.0085 0.0270* -0.0080 0.0269* 
 (-0.56) (1.68) (-0.52) (1.67) 
FSI -0.0067* -0.0002 -0.0063* -0.0003 
 (-1.79) (-0.13) (-1.74) (-0.15) 
ROA -0.4384 -0.4846* -0.4017 -0.4866* 
 (-1.58) (-1.89) (-1.47) (-1.88) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.0057* 0.0045 0.0059* 0.0044 
 (1.84) (1.46) (1.92) (1.42) 
TobinQ -0.0395* -0.0005 -0.0384 -0.0005 
 (-1.66) (-0.03) (-1.62) (-0.02) 
Leverage 0.1241** 0.0710 0.1238* 0.0707 
 (2.14) (1.12) (1.67) (1.11) 
OwnershipC 0.0882 0.1379** 0.0750 0.1386** 
 (0.83) (2.18) (0.60) (2.18) 
CeoHolding -4.5792 -4.8901 -4.4921 -4.8972 
 (-0.36) (-0.63) (-0.35) (-0.63) 
CDUAL -0.0302 -0.0153 -0.0316 -0.0152 
 (-1.10) (-0.54) (-1.12) (-0.54) 
BINDP 0.0157 0.0176 0.0140 0.0179 
 (0.84) (1.10) (0.75) (1.11) 
BSIZE -0.0319 -0.0135 -0.0291 -0.0137 
 (-1.48) (-0.63) (-1.30) (-0.64) 
BMEET -0.0105 -0.0032 -0.0119 -0.0031 
 (-0.92) (-0.28) (-1.03) (-0.27) 
Constant -0.2004 -0.1628 -0.4066 -0.1588 
 (-0.92) (-0.54) (-1.48) (-0.53) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0482 0.1224 0.0298 0.1243 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Appendix D.2.  
The impact of the number of Chinese and English news reports on the foreign share discount  
(Using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership)  
 
This table presents the impact of the number of Chinese and foreign news reports on the foreign share discount, using the alternative proxy for CEO ownership 
(CeoHolding). CeoHolding is the proportion of shares held by the CEO. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression  
(1) 
Regression  
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Regression 
 (5) 
Regression  
(6) 
       
CGNEWS 0.0085** 0.0075* 0.0074* 0.0067* 0.0085** 0.0066 
 (1.98) (1.88) (1.78) (1.69) (2.03) (1.66) 
EBNEWS 0.7343 0.5475 0.2092 0.1736 0.3289 0.1866 
 (1.35) (1.49) (0.39) (0.47) (0.59) (0.49) 
CGNEWS*EBNEWS   2.0587** 1.4652* 2.0295* 1.4833* 
   (1.97) (1.80) (1.97) (1.85) 
RelativeMV 0.4153** 0.4924* 0.4159** 0.4915* 0.6086** 0.4906* 
 (2.20) (1.90) (2.20) (1.89) (2.51) (1.88) 
RelativeTO 0.0915*** 0.0739*** 0.0912*** 0.0737*** 0.0924*** 0.0739*** 
 (4.82) (4.44) (4.81) (4.42) (5.14) (4.42) 
StateControl 0.0355** 0.0334** 0.0353** 0.0332** 0.0376** 0.0333** 
 (2.27) (2.09) (2.26) (2.08) (2.30) (2.07) 
Reform -0.0381*** -0.1104*** -0.0380*** -0.1100*** -0.0397*** -0.1106*** 
 (-3.56) (-10.18) (-3.56) (-10.10) (-3.62) (-10.21) 
RelativeRET 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
 (1.20) (0.49) (1.21) (0.50) (1.28) (0.58) 
Beta -0.0084 0.0270* -0.0087 0.0268* -0.0082 0.0267 
 (-0.55) (1.69) (-0.57) (1.67) (-0.53) (1.66) 
FSI -0.0067* -0.0002 -0.0067* -0.0003 -0.0063* -0.0003 
 (-1.79) (-0.12) (-1.79) (-0.14) (-1.74) (-0.16) 
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ROA -0.4407 -0.4837* -0.4386 -0.4821* -0.3986 -0.4841* 
 (-1.58) (-1.88) (-1.58) (-1.88) (-1.47) (-1.87) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.0057* 0.0045 0.0057* 0.0045 0.0059* 0.0044 
 (1.84) (1.47) (1.84) (1.46) (1.92) (1.41) 
TobinQ -0.0391 -0.0000 -0.0396* -0.0005 -0.0384 -0.0005 
 (-1.64) (-0.00) (-1.67) (-0.02) (-1.62) (-0.02) 
Leverage 0.1238** 0.0707 0.1244** 0.0715 0.1243* 0.0712 
 (2.17) (1.12) (2.19) (1.13) (1.68) (1.13) 
OwnershipC 0.0849 0.1339** 0.0871 0.1357** 0.0723 0.1365** 
 (0.81) (2.12) (0.83) (2.15) (0.58) (2.15) 
CeoHolding -4.6716 -4.9788 -4.5727 -4.8962 -4.5047 -4.9019 
 (-0.37) (-0.64) (-0.36) (-0.63) (-0.35) (-0.63) 
CDUAL -0.0304 -0.0154 -0.0305 -0.0155 -0.0319 -0.0154 
 (-1.11) (-0.54) (-1.11) (-0.54) (-1.13) (-0.54) 
BINDP 0.0156 0.0174 0.0158 0.0175 0.0140 0.0177 
 (0.84) (1.09) (0.84) (1.10) (0.74) (1.11) 
BSIZE -0.0319 -0.0132 -0.0323 -0.0136 -0.0292 -0.0138 
 (-1.49) (-0.62) (-1.50) (-0.63) (-1.31) (-0.64) 
BMEET -0.0104 -0.0032 -0.0103 -0.0031 -0.0118 -0.0031 
 (-0.92) (-0.28) (-0.91) (-0.28) (-1.03) (-0.27) 
constant -0.1871 -0.1655 -0.1872 -0.1646 -0.4066 -0.1603 
 (-0.87) (-0.55) (-0.87) (-0.55) (-1.48) (-0.53) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.0480 0.1199 0.0486 0.1206 0.0287 0.1225 
Obs. 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
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Appendix E. 
The impact of the number of Chinese and English news reports on the foreign share discount 
(Using unscaled main independent variables) 
 
This table presents the impact of the number of Chinese and foreign news reports on the foreign share discount, using unscaled main independent variables. 
  
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
(6) 
Regression 
(7) 
CGNEWS 0.0001* 0.0001*** 0.0001* 0.0001*** 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001 
 (1.79) (3.16) (1.85) (2.71) (1.691) (2.031) (1.654) 
EBNEWS 0.0039 0.0074 0.0053 0.0022 0.0017 0.0034 0.0018 
 (0.78) (1.24) (1.54) (0.35) (0.462) (0.606) (0.497) 
CGNEWS*EBNEW    0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0002* 0.0001* 
    (2.32) (1.760) (1.886) (1.803) 
RelativeMV  0.419*** 0.478* 0.419*** 0.499* 0.615** 0.498* 
  (6.90) (1.86) (6.90) (1.955) (2.574) (1.942) 
RelativeTO  0.0912*** 0.0739*** 0.0910*** 0.0734*** 0.0921*** 0.0736*** 
  (12.97) (4.43) (12.95) (4.379) (5.062) (4.378) 
StateControl  0.0367*** 0.0349** 0.0365*** 0.0346** 0.0389** 0.0346** 
  (5.12) (2.23) (5.08) (2.214) (2.398) (2.204) 
Reform  -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0390*** -0.111*** 
  (-10.20) (-10.15) (-10.20) (-10.09) (-3.615) (-10.19) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.000119 0.000290 0.000137 
  (1.09) (0.49) (1.11) (0.544) (1.303) (0.618) 
Beta  -0.0086 0.0291* -0.0089 0.0266* -0.00835 0.0265 
  (-1.56) (1.77) (-1.61) (1.668) (-0.546) (1.658) 
FSI  -0.0068*** -0.0005 -0.0069*** -0.000437 -0.00647* -0.000482 
  (-8.01) (-0.26) (-8.03) (-0.233) (-1.729) (-0.258) 
ROA  -0.421*** -0.424* -0.420*** -0.469* -0.381 -0.471* 
  (-3.72) (-1.66) (-3.77) (-1.851) (-1.422) (-1.846) 
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∆SalesGrowth  0.0049*** 0.0037 0.0049*** 0.00396 0.00520 0.00387 
  (3.32) (1.19) (3.32) (1.273) (1.629) (1.231) 
TobinQ  -0.0410*** -0.0001 -0.0414*** -0.00198 -0.0402* -0.00201 
  (-4.64) (-0.0033) (-4.69) (-0.0948) (-1.699) (-0.0956) 
Leverage  0.128*** 0.0704 0.128*** 0.0746 0.129* 0.0743 
  (6.44) (1.11) (6.47) (1.183) (1.747) (1.176) 
OwnershipC  0.0807** 0.135** 0.0830** 0.135** 0.0715 0.136** 
  (2.33) (2.14) (2.40) (2.159) (0.569) (2.162) 
CHOLD  -0.0198*** -0.0143 -0.0194*** -0.0138 -0.0184 -0.0139 
  (-2.79) (-0.69) (-2.74) (-0.660) (-0.783) (-0.662) 
CDUAL  -0.0281** -0.0142 -0.0282** -0.0138 -0.0298 -0.0138 
  (-2.19) (-0.48) (-2.20) (-0.462) (-1.014) (-0.458) 
BINDP  0.0159** 0.0141 0.0161** 0.0176 0.0143 0.0179 
  (2.20) (0.88) (2.22) (1.105) (0.766) (1.115) 
BSIZE  -0.0310*** -0.0107 -0.0314*** -0.0129 -0.0283 -0.0131 
  (-4.97) (-0.50) (-5.04) (-0.604) (-1.273) (-0.610) 
BMEET  -0.0093** -0.0030 -0.0093** -0.00232 -0.0109 -0.00229 
  (-2.34) (-0.27) (-2.34) (-0.206) (-0.943) (-0.202) 
constant 0.493*** -0.188*** -0.160 -0.188*** -0.172 -0.412 -0.167 
 (73.16) (-2.69) (-0.54) (-2.68) (-0.579) (-1.521) (-0.565) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0526 0.0527 0.11316 0.0533 0.1242 0.0322 0.1224 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A.  
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
